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 1 
Abstract  
 
The debate about companies in conflict zones and how they link with human rights 
violations has gained more attention recently in both business and International 
Relations. As a result of negative role played by some of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) in conflict zones, the profile of business in conflict prevention, governance and 
democratization has become more defined. This is due to the outcry concerning the 
activities of MNCs in conflict zones. The international community has vigorously 
campaigned for effective regimes to guide the conduct of MNCs in conflicts. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to figure out both direct and indirect role that the MNCs played 
in conflict areas such as Angola where there are massive abuse of human rights. The 
increase in foreign direct investment has created a myriad of opportunities for expansion 
within developing countries such as Angola, the study wants to make intense analysis of 
that expansion in zones of conflict as to whether companies are a force for good or not, 
deriving empirical evidence of Angola. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Research Proposal 
1.1 Introduction 
 
“Companies appear to be taking the business ramifications of conflict far more seriously, 
yet with limited consideration of the full extent of their responsibilities. Certainly, they 
see conflict resolution as primarily the responsibility of government yet find themselves in 
context specific situations where they are nevertheless expected to work actively to 
protect and promote human rights. In addition to “traditional” civil and political rights, 
companies’ human rights responsibilities are increasingly recognized. The process of 
managing human rights and company’s economic performance in conflict zones are 
directly related.”1  Rory Sullivan 
 
Towards the end of twentieth century, the role of companies in conflict zones has 
attracted a lot of attention from scholars of International Relations and policy makers.   
Furthermore, much of work on private sector operations and armed conflict has also 
derived from international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Global 
Witness, Human Rights Watch, International Alert, etc. There has been a growing 
concern over the social impact of international commerce, which has brought to the fore 
increasing attention to social problems such as human rights violations, corruption and 
transparency.2 For the past decade, most of the undertaken studies by NGOs such as 
Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, and International Alert have alleged that there is a 
correlation between business activities in conflict situations and human rights violations.  
 
For instance, the research done by Human Rights Watch and Global Witness in Angola 
alleged that diamond companies such as South African based company De Beers have 
                                                 
1
 Rory Sullivan, ‘Human Rights and Companies in Conflict Zones,’ in Conflict, Security & Development 
Vol.3 No.2, Centre for Defense Studies, Carfax Publishing, 2003, pp. 287 
2
 Atie Christer Christiansen, ‘Beyond Petroleum: Can BP Deliver? FNI Report 6, Fridtjof Nansens Institutt 
2002, pp.8 accessible from the internet on http://www.fni.no/pdf/FNI-R0602.pdf 
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benefited a lot from getting access to diamonds reserves through Union of Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group while helping such a group to continue 
with war that had acute impact on civilians. 
 
Companies in the extractive or mining and energy industries seem to be on the frontline 
when coming to this debate. They are of a particular interest, given that most of the 
conflicts in Africa are fueled by the proceeds from the selling of precious natural 
resources and contestation over control of natural resources.3 Furthermore, the 
exploitation of natural resources such as oil, timber, and diamonds has fuelled conflict 
and generated corruption, exacting a heavy toll in lives and undermining faith in public 
administration in Africa4 
 
 It appears that the main problem is lack of capability of African states to exercise control 
over natural resources and to regulate activities of MNCs. Due to weak governance, some 
places where the natural resources are exploited are under control of the rebel groups. 
This gives a room for rebel groups to exploit natural resources and enter into business 
transactions with MNCs. This situation allows chaos and creates an environment that 
exacerbates conflict.  Apart from the rebels, there is again an issue about extractive 
companies doing business with authoritarian regimes that commit atrocities to their own 
citizens. Authoritarian regimes normally use revenues they accrue from companies to buy 
                                                 
3
 Ian Banon & Paul Collier, (ed) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, World 
Bank, 2003, pp.6      
4
 Dan Smith, ‘Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries,’ International Alert,  
   2005, pp.1 accessible from the internet at: 
   http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/security_ conflict_sensitive_business.pdf 
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weapons and creating a system of patronage, which in turn could create or exacerbate a 
conflict.  
 
In an economy heavily depended on extractive industry such as of Angola, MNCs in this 
sector typically provide large revenues to governments and rebel groups in the form of 
taxes, royalties and other payments. In a country with severe governance and fiscal 
control problems, these payments can contribute to violence.5 Given this situation, Jakkie 
Cilliers argues that the insistence by some in business that ‘the role of business is to do 
business’ is nonsensical in a country (Angola) where oil revenues will comprise 90, 5% 
of 2001 budget of about US $3.18 billion.6 This brings us to the debates that corporate 
responsibilities in conflict-ridden countries appear to be necessary.  
 
Given this background, it is in the interest of this research to explore such a controversial 
debate about companies doing business in unstable countries. This research chooses 
Angola as a case study. Angola is chosen mainly due to abundance of its natural 
resources and the role that natural resources played in the Angolan civil war. Though the 
conflict started in 1975, the period chosen here is 1992-2005. This period is important 
because it is a post-Cold War era, where countries such as Cuba, South Africa, United 
States of America (USA), and Russia had withdrawn from Angolan war.  
 
                                                 
5
 OECD, ‘Multinational Enterprises in Situations of Violent Conflict and Wide Spread of Human Abuses,’                
Working Paper on the International Investment No.2002/1, 2002, pp.3. This is a report by the OECD  
Secretariat, which has been prepared for and discussed by the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/31/2757771.pdf 
6
 Jackie Cilliers,  ‘Business and War,’ in African Security Review  No 3 Vol 10, Institute for Security 
Studies, 2001, pp.3 
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It is alleged that both warring parties have resorted to exploitation of oil and diamond to 
fund war.  Angolan case could give clear evidence on the interactions between oil and 
diamond companies in the civil conflict. This research is interested in studying 
companies in diamond and oil sectors. These are two main sectors in the economy of 
Angola. Among others, the main natural resource based companies that have been doing 
business in Angola are: Sodian, De Beers, Chevron, Elf, Texaco TotalFina, Royal Dutch, 
Shell, ExxonMobil, BP, Statoil, Ranger, etc.  These are companies that have been mostly 
accused of playing a negative role directly and indirectly that perpetuated war in Angola.  
 
1.2 Aim and Rationale 
 
The aim of the thesis is to figure out the correlation between business activities and 
human rights violations by resource-based MNCs (diamond and oil) in a broader African 
conflict Zones while using the case of Angola. The aim of this thesis is to figure out both 
direct and indirect role that the MNCs played in conflict areas such as Angola where 
there are massive abuse of human rights. The main purpose is to provide ways and new 
thinking that may help enhance the positive and reduce negative effects of international 
business in developing regions such as Africa.  
 
 The increase in foreign direct investment has created a myriad of opportunities for 
expansion within developing countries, even to the countries that have been unstable such 
as Angola. The study wants to make intense analysis of that expansion in zones of 
conflict as to whether companies are a force for good or not, deriving empirical evidence 
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of Angola. This research aims to contribute to the intellectual debate about the character 
of new conflicts, which do present new actors such as MNCs, which have been partly 
ignored in the literature of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and resolutions. And again 
to provide a basis for the development of new approaches to conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping, which could assist policy makers, corporate decision makers and activists. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
• Were natural resourced based multinationals (diamond and oil companies) 
contributed to human rights violations during the civil conflict in Angola?  
• Was there any link between business activities of those multinationals and human 
rights violations in civil conflict of Angola?  
• If yes, how have they contributed to human rights violations in Angola and what 
activities both direct and indirect have undermined human rights issues? 
• Should natural resource based multinationals continue to invest in conflict zones?  
• Are international laws adequate in ensuring companies are accountable for human 
rights abuses when operating outside of their home state, particularly in zones of 
conflict like Angola? 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
 
Natural resource based multinationals are more likely to undermine their corporate ethics 
when they operate in places where there is political instability and weak governance such 
 12 
as in Angola. Therefore, such behaviour usually makes them to contribute towards human 
rights violations in such places. They may contribute to human rights violations by 
fuelling already existing war and exacerbating a system of corruption and weak 
governance. An increase adoption of monitoring mechanism of companies at and 
international level will increase transparency on companies operations in political 
unstable places like Angola. Furthermore, to improve business practices, international 
efforts are necessary to create an external system of compliance and monitoring which 
ensures corporations adopt conflict-sensitive policies, which positively contribute to 
peace, prosperity and stability in conflict zones.7   
 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
 
To give the theoretical framework, the study has considered postmodernist or ‘critical’ 
human security approach that is rooted in pluralist theory of international politics. This 
approach is base on a set of assumptions that essentially attempt to dislodge state as the 
primary referent of human security, while placing greater emphasis on the 
interdependency and transnationalization of non-state actors such as MNCs.8 The critical’ 
or postmodernist approach to human security, that is reflected in the work of Ken Booth, 
also advocates for a broadened conceptualization approach to security that goes beyond a 
military determination threats.9  
 
                                                 
7
 Paula Richardson, ‘Corporate Crime in a Globalized Economy: An Examination of the Corporate Legal   
Conundrum and Positive Prospects for Peace’ Carleton University, 2003, pp.2  
8
 Ken Booth, ‘A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations,’ in South African 
Perspectives No.30, Center for Southern African Studies, 1994, pp.3  
9
 Ibid 
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The post-modernist approach stresses quite explicitly that the state should not only be a 
primary referent of human security, and should encompass instead a wide range of non-
state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, 
multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations and just all human 
kind.10 
 
Based on the above assumptions, this research would like raise issues such as, should 
protecting human rights in conflict areas encompass these new actors such as MNCs and 
not only be traditional role of the state? In trying to provide answers to the above 
question, this study will argue that human rights issues can no longer be issues of states. 
The transnational actors such MNCs have become powerful actors that operate within 
and beyond borders of the state and have increasingly involved in areas where there is 
massive human rights violations such as in conflict zones or where governance is weak.  
 
Furthermore, on post-modernist approach Claude Buderhein argues that multinational 
corporations operating in conflict zones are non-state actors whose potential exists should 
contribute to fostering conflict prevention and generating wider respect for human 
security.11   This theory argues that non-state actors such MNCs should play a positive 
rather than negative role to bring about large-scale development or resolve the threats 
facing civilians in conflict zones or where governance is weak. It would be in the interest 
                                                 
10
 Ken Booth, op. cit. 
11
 Claude Bunderhein, ‘The Role of  Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: the Case of Armed 
Groups in Civil Wars,’ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,  2000, pp.4 accessible on the internet at  
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/report_may2000_2-e.php 
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of this research to widely apply this theory and exploring its relevance to the 
contemporary world. 
1.6 Literature Review 
 
In reviewing literature, we identify authors with different views on particular issues 
related to multinational corporations and human rights violations in conflict zones, and 
make our contribution by adding relevant facts which we intend to put forward in the 
course of conducting this study in areas where such facts are lacking.  
 
Currently, there has been a growing literature interested in companies in conflict zones 
and with more emphasis on human security issues. However, such literature is many 
composed of journals, there is little specific books written on this area. The main impetus 
for increasing attention to the issues of business in armed conflict comes from the recent 
research concerned with the politically economy of civil wars, (Keen, 1998, Collier and 
Hoeffer 1998, Berdal and Malome, 2000, Ballentine and Sherman, 2003 ). These authors 
give a good introduction on how resource wars link with business and give a very good 
introduction of this research.   
 
From the work done on political economy of civil wars there has been growing body 
literature that suggest that multinational corporations can play indirect (and inadvertent) 
roles in the logic of violence and human rights as the taxes and royalties they pay enter 
extremely weak frameworks for public governance, (Dietrich, 2000, Cilliers, 2001, 
OECD, 2002, Ballentine and Nitzchke, 2004,)  
 15 
 
The above writers argue that many contemporary conflicts have become increasingly 
self-financing in nature as both rebels and governments, faced with a post-cold war 
decline in superpower support; they have sought alternate sources of revenue to sustain 
their military campaigns. The exploitation and trade of in lucrative natural resources in 
particular has become a major source of combatant self-financing and corporations have 
played significant role in abating combatants to continue with massive human rights 
violations. This argument is basically at the centre of this research. This argument is used 
in this research to assist this research to explore at the nature of post-cold war were 
external support to many combatants seized and new methods to finance conflicts came 
into the picture which include MNCs.    
 
Again, (Hodges, 2003, Ross, 2001, and IRIN, 2005) suggest that nowhere, was the 
humanitarian price of these war economies more evident than in Angola, where revenue 
from oil and diamond generated millions of dollars in profit for rival elite but resulted in 
atrocious loss of life and crippling poverty for country’s population.  
 
The United Nations (2000) report on protection of civilians in armed conflict has actually 
reported that “individuals and companies take advantage of, maintain, and even initiate 
armed conflict in order to plunder destabilized countries to enrich themselves, with 
devastating consequences for civilian population. Partnership with repressive and corrupt 
host regimes or other non-state actors that violate human rights and humanitarian 
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principles has become more of strategy of companies to benefit in conflict zones, 
(Dietrich, 2000, OECD, 2002, Ballentine and Nitzchke, 2004,)  
 
Apart from well-published literature reviewed above, there is another view which argues 
that it is not corporations general absence of concern that leads them to make choices 
with negative repercussion for human security, but lack of information about, and lack of 
understanding of humanitarian and human rights principles, as participant in the conflict 
to uphold them (Bunderlein, 2000, Berman, 2000, Campell, 2000, Cain, 2001).  This 
would be very interesting as this study has tried to finding out if corporations do actually 
contribute to human rights violations unintentional, as most of the above literature has 
argue that corporations are driven by existing opportunities to benefit more in conflict 
zones and there seems to be a general consensus, by looking at mostly of above literature. 
 
The literature concerning the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and 
post-conflict peace-building has also been considered in this study. The literature claims 
that due to negative role played by some multinationals in conflict zones, positive role by 
MNCs in conflict prevention would help to end human rights violations. Contributing to 
conflict prevention or management may also fit into a company’s policies on corporate 
social responsibility (Banfield and Chapman, 2004 and OECD, 2002, HWR, 2000, UN, 
1998). They went on to highlight that corporations should be careful about preventing 
business activity from having harmful effects on population, the environment, and help 
the political process aimed at promoting stability and peace. The role of multinational 
should enlicit in combating “elicit trafficking, corrupt resource deals, rent seeking and the 
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flow of resources that can stoke or be the motive of violent conflicts, (OECD, 2002, 
HRW, 2000, and UN, 2004). 
 
What is clear from above literature is preventive measures that companies could adopt 
but there is a considerable limited attention between human rights and conflict 
management by companies. This research would try to depart from the preventive 
measures that the above literature suggests and will raise new issues. Issues like how 
risks could be managed in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict or human rights 
violations, and if they do occur, how to minimize the adverse consequences. To go 
further, much is needed to assess the role of companies in post-conflict reconstruction 
and how they could assist communities emerging from conflict situations and this study 
has addressed that looking at current situations in Angola. 
 
Another literature that got attention is sanctions and corporations in conflict zones. 
(Smith, 2005 and Sherman, 2002) argue that although sanctions have been applied to 
non-state actors, it has been limited to armed groups, Security Council could extend 
sanctions to include private firms implicated in sanctions-busting or those which 
knowingly traffic in illicitly exploited natural resources.  
 
They argue that self-regulation alone is ultimately insufficient to ensure that private 
sector activities do not directly or indirectly contribute to armed conflict. Voluntary 
measures lack rigorous enforcement and broad coverage. Smith continues to highlight 
that international legal framework and standards on business and conflict issues is an 
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important step towards conflict-sensitivity, and is likely to place companies in a good 
positions in the future. (Richardson, 2003, Kamminga, 2004, Vazquez, 2004) also 
concurred by arguing that in order to improve business practices, international efforts 
must create an external system of compliance and monitoring which ensures corporations 
adopt conflict-sensitive policies, which positively contribute to peace, prosperity and 
stability.  
 
To further extend this debate, this study will further analyze whether it is feasibly to 
extend sanctions and international legal frameworks to corporations in conflict zones. 
However, presently corporations seem to favor self-regulations or voluntary practices. 
The study will give intensive analysis of voluntary self-regulations and legal binding 
obligations in order to order to come with the best recommendations using some 
examples of Angola.    
 
To go further, this study will question if an international regulatory framework for 
companies could either require states to regulate corporate behavior within their 
jurisdiction or could it be directly imposed at the international level. Again, which of the 
two methods could be more feasibly? 
      
1.7 Methodology 
 
The approach adopted in this research is qualitative. The qualitative approach performs a 
careful “content analysis” of the primary and secondary sources (documents), which 
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adduce as evidence-speeches, press statements, governments reports, diplomatic 
massages, personal memoirs, interviews, scholarly studies etc.12 Both primary and 
secondary texts has been used throughout in this research.  The primary data is basically 
information obtained form international treaties, and policy documents. This has included 
UN Security Council Declaration Report papers on Angola, UNDP reports, speeches and 
policy documents of the government of Angola and statements issued by companies 
doing business in Angola. Interviews also formed part of this research. Nkosinathi 
Ndlovu of African Institute for Corporate Citizenship. Mxolisi Makiwana of Africa 
Institute of South Africa who did a project on Anti-money laundering in Southern Africa 
was also interviewed and other various Angolan citizens around Johannesburg. Some of 
the interviews were declined.   
 
Secondary documents have been obtained ranging from books, scholastic journals and 
online academic information through the Internet.  The extensive data was collected from 
University of the Witwatersrand Libraries including Jan Smuts House library, University 
of Johannesburg main library in Auckland Park and from Africa Institute of South Africa.  
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
The study would have preferred to study one or two companies in order to come up with 
comprehensive conclusion, but due to limited information, the study has become a 
general study of companies in oil and diamond sectors in Angola. There is also lack of 
                                                 
12
 J.E. Doughorty & J. Pfaltzgraff.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive 
Survey, Harper and Row Publishers, 1981. pp.37 
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academic books and journals covering the topic of this research, therefore bulk of 
information has been derived from the Internet and advocacy work of NGOs.  Limitation 
of information could be one the weaknesses of this research.   
 
1.9 Organisation of Work 
 
Chapter one, gives introduction to the topic outlined fundamental goals, the theoretical 
framework as well as the methodology.  Chapter two gives historical background of 
MNCs in general and conflict prone Africa. Chapter three attempts to evaluate MNCs as 
actors in conflict zones and will analyze how they have become major actors in Africa 
particularly Angola. It will also look at how they correlate with human rights issues in the 
conflict of Angola. It argues that the investment of mining and extractive sector has not 
been for the benefit of the people of Angola and the investment has been a curse instead 
of a blessing. The focus is on oil and diamond companies.  It traces the role of MNCs 
during the conflict of Angola particularly after the resurgence of war in early 1990’s until 
the end of the war in 2002.  
Chapter four is about how companies can apply corporate social responsibility in conflict 
areas and what measures companies can adopt to promote human rights, peace and 
development in Angola. The chapter argues that adoptions of Corporate Social 
Responsibilities (CSR) could play a crucial role in building peace and ending human 
rights abuses in Angola, especially at this time of post-conflict reconstruction era. 
Chapter five brings a controversial debate on why it is crucial to regulate MNCs 
particularly those operating in conflict zones like in Angola. The chapter argues that the 
 21 
atrocities in Angola would not have occurred if there were strong international 
enforcement regulations that corporations could have adhere to. It will assess whether 
international regulatory framework is feasible.  And why it should be implemented. 
Chapter six provides an answer to research questions and also give the summary of 
lessons learnt and recommendations 
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Chapter 2 
2  Historical Background  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will attempt to set a historical background of the role of MNCs in general 
and it will also specifically look at their role in the post Cold War Africa. To begin with a 
definition, multinational corporations are large companies that conduct their business 
operations in several states.13 They have one common feature, and that is the fact that 
they are mainly from rich countries such USA, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and Italy, although in the last decade there has been emergence of 
MNCs from emerging markets Brazil, China, India South Africa and other middle-
income economies. There are various kinds MNCs and this is mainly due to various 
sectors they operate in. Some are in mining, manufacturing, telecommunications and 
service, finance, etc. Large corporations have become more important economic actors in 
the global affairs than are many poor states. These are corporations that have annual 
turnover than most poor nations.  
 
MNCs have a long history. The modern MNCs have its roots in the East and West Indies 
traders of the mercantilist era of the 16th- 18th centuries.14 During this period, there were 
major merchant firms such as The Hudson’s Bay Co., The East India Co., The Royal 
                                                 
13
 UN Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Multinational Corporations in Least Developed Countries 
(LDC)’, Discussion Article, 2002, pp. 2 accessible from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2002/modelun.pdf 
14
 Ibid 
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African Co. that organized long-distance trade with America, Africa and Asia.15 The 
mercantilists walked all over the world in search for resources and markets. Although 
these were merely traders they paved a way for international business, and led 
colonization of Third World countries.   
 
However, after the World War II, the growing trend of globalization has allowed MNCs 
to expand and pursue possibilities beyond borders among nations. Globalization can be 
defined as the process of the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural 
across international boundaries.16 Open trade, free flows of finance, the rapid 
dissemination of new technology and ideas, heightened competition among national and 
regional economies, new accumulation of capital and wealth, abrupt shifts in production 
by MNCs in search for lower wages, equity investment funds hunting the most profitable 
‘emerging market’- all pointed to the increasingly complex and interlinked nature of 
globalization and the greater predominance of the market over the state.17 
 
This rapid expansion of globalization after World War II was made possible by 
institutions of global economic governance, which emerged after the war, such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which in 1995 came to be known as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  
                                                 
15
 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, (ed) Economics and World Order: from the 1970’s to the 1990’s, Macmillan, 1972, 
pp.115  
16
 S.T. Akindele, T.O. Gidado, & O.R. Olaopo,  ‘Globalisation, Its Implications and Consequences for 
Africa’ Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, 2002 
http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.1/01_akindele_etal.html 
17
 Ernest Harsch, ‘Africa, Asia and Anxieties about Globalisation,’ in Review of African Political Economy 
No.79 Vol. 26, Carfax Publishers , 1999, pp.119 
 24 
 
These institutions are normally have been used as instrument to advance globalization. 
IMF and World Bank are expanding globalization by crafting economic policies of 
countries in favor of greater openness. The IMF and the World Bank play crucial roles in 
the enthronement of capital, this has been done through policies such as liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation.18 MNCs have taken an advantage of such a process. They 
have continued to expand beyond borders of nations in large numbers. The developing 
nations such as in Africa, Asia and Latin America have also felt the presence of MNCs.   
 
In the last two decades MNCs have continue to play an increasing role in developing 
countries. MNCs have become an important vehicle for the movement of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).19 After the post- Cold War era, in the late 1980’s, FDI in developing 
countries by MNCs has greatly surpassed the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
from developed countries. According to Robert Davies of the Prince of Wales Business 
Leaders, “Private sector investment in developing countries now exceeds that of 
governments more than ten-fold.”20 As ODA funding stagnated, more development 
financing demands have shifted towards the private sector, requiring greater interaction 
and cooperation between civil society, government, and business.21 
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However, though everyone could recognize the increasing role of MNCs in global affairs 
and especially in developing countries, this has been accompanied by mixed views. That 
mainly depends to whether a person is analyzing such a role at Liberal point of view or 
Marxist point of view. Both views could either be right or wrong. Liberals view MNCs as 
an important partner in the process of economic, social and human development. Liberals 
view MNCs as agents of development that could spread resources, knowledge and 
expertise that help to develop developing countries.22 Furthermore, liberals argue that it is 
no accident that people in those Third World countries whose governments have been 
more open to the presence of MNCs have experienced significant improvements in their 
standard of living (e.g., Bermuda, Bahamas, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) while many countries hostile to MNCs continue to be mired in poverty.23 
 
On the other hand Marxists will argue that MNCs are particularly notorious for exploiting 
countries especially developing countries, causing problems regarding aspects of human 
rights, environmental conditions, government corruption, and economic fragility. 24 
Furthermore, there is an argument that MNCs are interested in profit maximization and 
their paramount interest is to remain as economic giants in developing countries so as to 
enjoy business profits, not concerns with developing those countries.25 
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Against all this background what has recently caught attention among scholars and policy 
makers is the role of MNCs in areas experiencing conflict and poor governance. In a 
process of expansion, MNCs have not only found themselves operating in sound political 
environment but often found themselves attempting to operate in the midst conflict 
areas.26 The natural resources based corporations are main investors than those in other 
sectors. MNCs in sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, supply chains of consumer 
goods, marketing are known to withdraw from conflict areas but MNCs in extractive 
sector do not. In fact some studies have shown that there has been increasing investment 
in areas experiencing instability and poor governance, particularly by natural resource 
based corporations. They have continued to operate in conflict zones, even at the added 
cost of managing attended risks.27 For instance, in the last decade, several emerging 
economies such as Colombia, Indonesia, Algeria, Angola and the Philippines, have been 
able to attract high levels of direct investment despite the occurrence of conflicts.28 
 
Furthermore, the following recent statistics also show the growing number of 
corporations investing in an unstable environment: 
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• In the year 2000, there were 72 countries at the security risk in which foreign 
business operates.29 
• Multinational companies are investing more than US$150 billion annually in 
nearly 50 countries which fall below the immediate point in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index- in other words in countries which 
may be confidently described as fairly to very corrupt.30 
There could be so many reasons to explain such behaviour. First, competitions among 
MNCs may often force them to operate in conflict-ridden regions. Second, by virtue of 
geography, natural resource based MNCs are bound to operate where lucrative and 
strategic natural resources- such as oil, gas, precious gems and minerals-are found. 
Increasingly, these are regions in the developing world experiencing violent instability or 
active combat.31 Third, high potential returns on investment that can be made in 
comparison to investments in stable regions where there are lots of regulations to adhere 
to.  
 
War is overwhelmingly bad for most businesses because of high uncertainty and 
insecurity putting at risk investment, staff, production, and trading.32 However 
corporations in extractive or mining sector usually invest their resources for a long-term 
period for exploitations of natural resources and usually are compelled to overlook 
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instabilities such as war. For instance, the major infrastructure invested to exploit oil, 
diamond, gold etc. 
 
With such an investment in unstable regions, international business community have 
found itself confronted with many challenges in its areas of operation, or being blamed 
for contributing to the conditions that lead to violent conflict or exacerbate conflict.33 
Consequently, an increasing amount of attention has been focused on the links between 
conflict and the activities of MNCs, and the role corporations play in conflicts.34 As 
armed conflict has become increasingly privatized, the role played by business actors in 
conflict zones has become more central to conflict dynamics.35 
 
The role played by extractive MNCs in African conflicts in the last decade is also quite 
interesting. However, this is not to say that such MNCs did not play a role in the past 
African conflicts. It is just that during the Cold War, the major focus was on the role of 
superpowers (US and Russia) on African conflicts. Extractive MNCs have been always 
around in Africa since colonization of Africa in the late 18th century. They were 
particularly drawn by vast natural of the continent such as oil, diamond, gold, timber, gas, 
iron, etc.   
 
The end of Cold War has shaped the character of African conflicts especially in an area 
of financing civil war. With the international support that warring parties enjoyed from 
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the socialist and capitalist bloc came to a halt. The warring parties resorted to the 
abundance natural resources of oil and diamond to finance their capabilities to fight. The 
exploitation of and trade in lucrative natural resources in particular has become a major 
source of combatants self-financing.36 For instance, wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory 
Cost, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Angola.  
 
These wars have both common features. They were all influenced and financed by vast 
natural resources in these countries. This was not done in the vacuum of multinational 
corporations as they did play supporting role to the warring parties. For instance in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the country has been crippled by conflict that has 
been going on for the past seven years. The previous UN reports from the panel of 
experts showed the link between the activities of multinational corporations and armed 
groups guilty of massacres and other atrocities.37 Normally warlords use natural resources 
to support their bloody activities with the help of MNCs. In the DRC it has been reported 
by Human Rights Watch in June 2005 that AngloGold Ashanti provided meaningful and 
financial support, which in turn resulted in political benefits to the FNI (Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front (FNI) and its leaders.38 This is a group responsible for bloody 
activities in DRC. 
 
The relationship between conflict and extractive companies has become a central one in 
Angola. The international attention to business activities in Angola has thus far focused 
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on large multinational companies, such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch, Shell, Chevron or 
British Petroleum (BP) in the oil and gas industry, De Beers with regards to the diamond 
trade, Rio Tinto and Freeport McMoran in the mining sector39.  
 
In Africa and particularly Angola the companies operating in extractive business have 
become strong actors in that economy. These companies have particularly spread their 
sphere of influence or to dominate the diamond and the oil sector. It has been alleged that 
the role played by these companies in perpetuating Angolan civil conflict has been 
mostly direct, indirect, and sometime unintended. 
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Chapter 3 
3 MNCs in African Conflict Zones: Oil and Diamond 
Companies in Angolan War 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will continue to argue that MNCs have become active actors in African 
conflict zones such in Angola departing from the previous chapter. It will highlight that 
the investment of mining and extractive sector has not been for the benefit of the people 
of Angola and the investment has been a curse instead of a blessing. It traces the role of 
MNCs during the conflict of Angola particularly after the resurgence of war in early 
1990’s until the end of the war in 2002. 
 
3.2 The Conflict in Angola  
 
Angola presents a terrible, shocking paradox.40 One of the best resource endowments in 
Africa has been associated not with development and relative prosperity, but with years 
of conflict, economic decline and human misery on a massive scale.41 Angola has been in 
a conflict over the last three decades. The civil conflict started in 1975, the year of 
independence from the Portuguese government and it ended in 2002. The war claimed 
1.5 million people out of population of 14 million and displaced 4 million people, and 
destroying a majority of the country’s infrastructure and social fablic.42 During these 
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three decades, the conflict shifted from national liberation struggle, to Cold War, and to a 
war fuelled by exploitation of natural resources by elites on either side.43 The main 
warring parties have been the Movement of Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the 
ruling party and Union of Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the rebel group.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, this research has no interest in looking at war influenced 
by liberation struggle and Cold War but is interested in post-cold war Angolan conflict 
that was more sustained by exploitation of natural resources. This is for the purpose of 
showing the role played by corporations in sustaining post-cold war Angolan war. 
 
The post-Cold War Angolan war was commonly known as war economy. The definition 
of war economy dates back to the end of Cold War when numerous armed groups began 
to rely heavily on revenues from natural resources, such as oil, timber, or gems, in the 
absence of politically-motivated sponsorship to finance conflicts.44 This was a common 
trend in the early 1990s in the most African countries, which were experiencing civil 
wars.  
 
Sensing the end of affairs, as they knew it, the Angolan warring parties began an early 
scramble for the possession and control of the resource-rich areas of Angola.45 This is not 
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to say there was no exploitation of natural resources by warring parties before 1990, but it 
was not a focus. It has been well documented that the decline into renewed civil war, 
following the failure of the 1992 elections, was financed for the major part by natural 
resources- oil and diamond.46 The MPLA had control over oil reserves and while UNITA 
controlled 70% of diamond territories.  
 
3.3 The Role of MNCs in Angolan War 
 
The best way to consider the role of MNCs in Angolan conflict is by looking at how they 
have contributed to sustainability of that conflict. The international economic forces such 
as MNCs have been able for a time being to step in and filled the role formerly played by 
foreign governments, such as United States of America (USA), Cuba, South Africa, 
Portugal and Russia in the conflict of Angola. In fact the role of MNCs has been that of 
fueling a conflict as the previous mentioned governments have done in the conflict of 
Angola. Much of the hard currency of multinationals in Angola is that they helped both 
the government (MPLA) and UNITA to arms procurement, the war effort, and to feed 
corruption.47   
 
3.3.1 The Oil Industries 
 
The oil sector is the largest in Angolan economy. It has drawn large oil multinationals 
since the discovery of oil in 1955 such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch, Shell, Chevron and 
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British Petroleum (BP) etc. Initially, the discovery mainly focused on onshore oil 
deposits in Cabinda region but in the late 1980’s major discovery was made off-shore on 
deep-sea water. That has furthermore attracted major oil companies around the globe to 
invest in oil exploration in Angola. Oil sector is the largest contributor to the Angolan 
state budget, representing as much as 90% of government revenues and, therefore, it has 
played a pivotal role in funding the war economy.48 Oil has been a key component in the 
regime’s ability to gain access to political and material resources beyond Angola’s 
borders; not just to markets (as with diamonds), but also to diplomatic channels and more 
politically connected commercial networks that directly advance the MPLA regime.49  
 
The use of foreign oil firms also offered opportunities for Angola’s rulers (as in other 
bureaucratically weak, but mineral rich states) to use this conjunction of strategic, 
diplomatic and commercial interests to influence the actions of outsiders and shape the 
balance of forces within Angola.50 Due to the abundance of oil that foreign corporations 
wanted to exploit, the government of Angola has always had a leverage to manipulate oil 
companies to meet political ends, which will be explained in detail in few paragraphs.  
 
The foreign corporate presence in Angola was especially significant since only handful of 
major multinationals drive the economy and safeguards the government from military 
defeat.51 The activities of foreign oil companies have affected the shape of the conflict; 
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the intense competition for oil concessions has led to a number of different companies 
seeking the favour of the Angolan state elites through dubious charitable donations, 
weapons deals, and other forms of assistance.52 Mining concessions appeared to have 
been tied to foreign firms’ willingness to play active roles in bolstering government 
security interests in Angola.53  
 
The presence of large multinational oil firms in Angola helped to create new channels for 
what can be called the ‘private diplomacy’ of Angola’s MPLA regime.54 The private 
diplomacy was basically private agreement between the MPLA regime and oil 
companies. What does that private diplomacy entailed? Foreign firms provided their 
MPLA hosts with access to the diverse and increasingly commercial channels through 
which wealthy nations provide foreign aid, such as expert guarantee schemes, loan to 
foreign investors, security arrangements and diplomatic support from the investment 
strategies of individual firms.55 This relationship helped the MPLA in its efforts to 
suppress internal challenges, such as UNITA and threat from within its own military.56 
This was possible because through the use of oil companies, the MPLA was capable of 
raising large amount of money through that private diplomacy. The money was easily 
used to buy weapons that sustained war.  
 
Moreover, the MPLA established a condition where big companies had to establish 
partnership with small companies that were brokering deals for arms supplies. In the 
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1990’s Sonangol Angolan state oil company started providing equity stakes to companies 
with linkages in the international arms industry as an alternative means of payment in 
kind for arms contracts.57 Brokering financial deals for arms supplies to the MPLA in the 
1990s was related to contracts for lifting Angolan oil. This was normally part of what is 
known as Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), on which big oil companies are forced 
to make partnership with small companies. The Angolan national company Sonangol is 
the one that facilitates the PSA. Small oil companies were made part of PSA because of 
their willingness to facilitate both financial and military supports to the government.   
 
For instance, Glencore, an oil-trading firm with experience in high-risk locations in 
Africa, facilitated such oil-backed loans for arms purchases.58 The Global Witness has 
also reported that small companies such as Heritage Oil and Coastal Oil also have 
provided loans for the government to purchase weapons during the 1992-94 periods.59 
Furthermore, in the 1997-1998 periods, Glencore reportedly arranged syndicated loans 
worth US$900 million for the MPLA 60 The Global Witness also noted that such partners 
notably have been included in Block 32 and Block 33, which are operated by 
TotalFinaElf and Exxon respectively61, because of the active role they played for 
supporting the MPLA. 
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Furthermore, the award of three blocks in 1999 to major oil firms such as Amoca, Elf, 
Exxon, Marathon, and Statoil procured the financial and technical capabilities necessary 
to explore for, and extract oil in deep water concessions.62 The inclusion of additional 
firms such as Prodev (Swiss company)- 20% equity partner in Elf’s block 32, Naphta 
(Israeli Compnay)- 5% equity partner in Exxon’s block 33 and Falcon Oil (Panamian 
company)- 10% equity partner in Exxon’s block 33 raised suspicions that these joint 
ventures mix oil production with arms purchases.63  
 
What do these small companies have in common is that they have close links with 
military companies. Sources indicate that there is a very close relationship between 
Naphta and a private military company called Levdan (Israeli company), whose senior 
manager is ex-Israeli army General Ze’ev Zahrine64. This was the company that was 
proving security arrangements for the MPLA.  Prodev, it is suggested that the company 
received its share as a ‘payment’ for weapons delivered, and this ‘payment in kind’ took 
place because the Angolan government did not possess the funds to pay with cash.65 
Falcone is linked with an influential individual in Luanda by the name of Pierre Falcone, 
who is a Brasillian but operates in France, and has been instrumental in a number 
financing and arms supply deals for the Angolan government.66  The importance of such 
contributions was not unimportant; for instance, in the bidding process for oil blocks, 
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companies enhanced their bids by pledging varying amounts as contributions to 
Sonangol’s Social Bonus Fund (subject to the award of the block).67  
 
Brokering arms deals was actually done given the huge competition among companies to 
access oil deposits. According to companies’ perception, no single company would have 
got leverage above its competitors by pushing agendas of political transformation and 
peace related initiatives. Good doers were more likely to be punished by sidelining them 
from getting access oil deposits.  
 
The role in arms brokering was not only done by small firms, the major oil companies 
also entered and benefiting in playing such roles in conflict of Angola. Former French 
company Elf-Aquitaine (which is now TotalElfina) was amongst the beneficiaries owing 
to its high-level connections in France and its association with French arms exports to 
Angola.68 More than any other oil company in Africa, France’s Elf has for years played a 
game of African politics not only to win control over coveted oil licenses, but as an arm 
of French diplomacy and intelligence.69 This could be particular true, since large 
economic investments have major influence in foreign policy by making an oil 
company’s home government less likely to take a strong stand against the domestic 
policies of the country in which investment is made.70 
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Elf officials bribed politicians, interfered in elections and lured governments into ruinous 
oil-backed loans in an attempt to protect the company’s market share. By funding the 
Government in Angola, Elf helped to prolong a conflict that cost an estimated 1.5 million 
lives and displaced millions of people.71  On March 17, 2003 a corruption trial began in 
Paris that involves thirty seven defendants who were accused of obtaining U.S. $430 
million from Elf Aquitaine for ‘personal enrichment and political kickbacks during the 
late 1980s and in the 1990s.72  
 
Furthermore, one of the main problems oil companies’ investment in Angola was that of 
oil companies’ payment to the government of Angola, whether through petroleum taxes 
or payments which is done secretly and in a corrupt manner. The major problem is that 
we do not know the actual payments made by the companies to the government, which 
discourages government accountability to its citizens and in turn assists the persistence of 
the government clientelist networks.73 Oil companies are told by the government not to 
publish what they pay to the government. This is part of PSA. Oil companies claims they 
cannot publish their figures, as the government obliges them to sign confidentiality 
laws.74 This practice really reflected that the nature of the relationship between the oil 
companies and government is basically corrupt and does not reflect business ethics.  
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Apart from corruption in companies payments, the private security companies employed 
to protect onshore oil explorations of major oil companies is one of the major controversy 
in conflict zones such Angola. This is more applicable to oil rich region of Cabinda in 
Angola. Oil companies are faced with other threats including kidnapping and killing of 
oil company staff and sabotage of oil installations.75 This is an area that had and is still 
experiencing more political instability through secessionist movements such as Frente 
para Libertacao do Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) that want independence of Cabinda. The 
Cabinda operations of oil companies also help to marginalize FLEC.76 Private security 
firms for large companies such as Chevron that has invested in the region and Angolan 
army units keep FLEC at bay and ensure that oil will continue to flow to finance the 
MPLA’s much larger war against UNITA.77 
 
Not only are private securities forces involved but also MPLA forces were also part of 
protecting oil reserves in Cabinda. This was essential as government accrue most revenue 
from oil companies. There is normally collaboration since oil companies knew that 
protection of their facilities would be of great interest for the host government, since such 
facilities supply an important part of government revenues.78 
 
Cabinda is one of the rich areas where Angola oil export comes from. This also an area 
where majority of local people are living in poverty despite the great wealth that oil 
multinationals are making out of that region.  Oil company operations in the area 
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exacerbates or create tensions between the central government and oil producing regions, 
especially if a disproportionate share of benefits is seen to accrue to the former and a 
disproportionate share of costs to the latter.79  
 
3.3.2 Diamond Industries 
  
The Angolan diamond sector is the second largest in the economy of Angola since its 
discovery in 1912. It has been a major export during the Portuguese colonial rule and 
after the years of independence in 1975. Due to oil booms in the late 1970’s and 1980s in 
Angola the government shifted its focus from the diamond sector. From the mid-1980s 
when UNITA extended its guerilla operations in the north of the country, making use of 
logistical facilities and sanctuaries across the border in the southern Zaire, the guerilla 
begun to threaten the diamond mines.80   The rebel group started to attack diamond 
mines, which resulted in destruction of mining equipment and closure of mining 
operations. As   a result of widespread of lawlessness, the rebel group took almost 70% of 
illegal diamond territories. 
 
In early 1990s, the Angolan diamond sector has been under the control of rebel group 
UNITA since the government lost control. It was an essential move by the group to beef 
up its efforts to proceed with the civil war. While the government bankrolled its war 
machine with the proceeds from oil, UNITA was able to secure control of lucrative 
diamond mines, generating revenues that would substitute for the loss of foreign military 
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assistance in the early 1990s.81 Since the resumption of war in 1992, UNITA has 
consistently controlled 70% of Angolan diamond production, generating US $3.7 billion 
in revenue, enabling them to maintain their war effort.82 Furthermore, Copper estimated 
that UNITA trade in diamonds earned it an estimated US $4.1 billion between 1992 and 
2000.83 Diamond companies mainly facilitated UNITA trade in diamonds without taking 
into account what such trade is doing to the people of Angola. 
 
The South African-British group De Beers and its Central Selling Organisation (CSO), is 
the major company that had dominated the Angola diamond sector and has been accused 
of buying rough diamonds of UNITA. De Beers annual reports during the 1990s clearly 
state the company’s heavy involvement in buying Angolan rough diamonds, at the height 
of resumed fighting and the time when UNITA controlled the majority of Angola’s 
diamond production.84 De Beers has admitted spending US$500 million to buy legally 
and illegally mined diamonds originating in Angola in 1992 in ‘open market 
transaction.’85 By so doing, De beers was so concern with keeping up their business 
going without realizing the adverse impact of such trade on the ordinary people of 
Angola who suffered greatly due to the continuation of civil war.  
 
Furthermore, the UN panel of experts in Angola claimed that from 1993 to 1994 much of 
UNITA’s military equipment was procured by a man known Watson, and that the 
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payment was in the form of rough diamonds to the De Beers sight holder company Joe 
De Decker.86    
 
Under international pressure to avoid being tainted, De Beers reacted to revelations of the 
of the laxity of the official marketing system in Angola by announcing, in October 1999, 
that it would cease to buy any Angolan diamonds, including even those bearing 
government certificates of origin, expect for the output of one particular mining in the 
Cuango valley which it was contractually obligated to purchase.87 The company was 
buying what has been commonly known as ‘blood diamonds’. ‘Blood or rough 
diamonds’ is a term used to describe diamonds originating from war-torn areas that are 
used to fund the military action by their traders.88 Diamonds in Angola are easy to mine 
and do not actually require sophisticated methods like in other countries.  UNITA 
warlords found it easier to employ artisans for diamond digging before they could sell 
them to companies that would sell them to the international market. 
 
The international trade in diamonds became a major obstacle to any possibly progress 
towards peace; and has played a major role in enabling UNITA to restock its munitions 
and maintain a flow of supplies which in turn has enabled it to disregard the 1992 
                                                 
86
 Action for Southern Africa, ‘United Nations Report Exposes Arms-for-Diamonds Scandal’ Angola Peace          
Monitor Issue No. 7, Vol. VI, 2000  
http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0607.html 
87
 Tony Hodges, op. cit, pp.189 
88
 Godfrey Lwanda, ‘Conflict Diamonds and the African Resource Curse’ in Conflict Trends No. 4, 
ACCORD, 2003, pp.21 
 44 
election results and to avoid meeting its obligations under the Lusaka protocol.89 The 
Lusaka protocol was part of peace initiative, which facilitated 1992 election. 
 
Even during the sanctions of UNITA, notably, the expert panels established by the UN 
Security Council to monitor sanctions compliance have increasingly “named and 
shamed” business actors for their suspected involvement in sanctions-busting.90 The UN 
imposed the first of a series of arms, travel and financial sanctions on the Angolan rebel 
movement, UNITA, in 1993 in an effort to weaken its war-making capacity. The UN 
Expert Panel's report on UNITA's sanctions-busting activities, named the company called 
De Decker as both arms and diamond dealer working with UNITA between 1993 and 
1997.91 This is one of the factors that have contributed for UNITA to wage war again in 
1998, just after a short period of peace agreement. Furthermore, lack of understanding 
and government scrutiny of the functioning of the diamond trade has resulted in the 
absence of any serious examination of corporate culpability, allowing many diamond 
companies to continue to operate without fear that consumers may call their actions into 
question.92 Such actions have really undermined peace throughout the late 1990’s in 
Angola.   
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3.4 The Impact of Corporate Misconduct on Human Rights and 
Development of Angola 
 
The role that MNCs played in the conflict of Angola was clearly stated from the previous 
discussion. Now, what are the impact such roles on human rights and development of the 
Angolan people? Companies’ involvement in corruption, lack of transparency and the 
purchase of military equipment by both side of the conflict undermined the ability of the 
people of Angola to build their own stable communities.93  It could be argued that human 
rights of Angolan people have been undermined in favour for corporate profits and 
political elite’s interests during the civil war. It has been well documented in the previous 
discussion that the multinational companies in both oil and diamond sector have 
undermined their business ethics and as a result, have contributed to massive human 
rights violation of which the MPLA and UNITA were major perpetrators. The MNCs 
have helped both MPLA and UNITA with efforts to sustain war. War has had adverse 
effects on the people of Angola. It has undermined the political, economic, and social 
rights of Angolan people.    
 
To start with, conceptual definition and origins of human rights is very essential. Human 
rights are fundamental principles that allowed individual to lead dignified lives, free from 
abuse and free to express independent beliefs.94 The origins of human rights originated 
just after the World War II when the United Nations was established. UN set a 
commission for human rights in 1948 and the United Declaration of Human Rights 
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(UDHR) was adopted. UDHR calls on every individual and organ agent of society to play 
their part in securing observance of the rights contained within the declaration.95 MNCs 
as organs of the society have actually undermined their part in securing observance of 
human rights as mentioned in UDHR in Angola. 
 
The Angolan people have been systematically abused in favour of corporate profits and 
personal gain by the warlords of both warring parties. War has actually benefited both oil 
and diamond companies and the MPLA regime and brought misery to the people of 
Angola. It has been estimated that close to half million people have lost their lives from 
1992-2002 and close to four million were internally displaced.   
 
Leading diamond companies such as De Beers rationales used to justify the buying of 
outside goods’ (unofficial diamonds) in countries such as Angola must be weighed in the 
balance with the possible and severe implications that such a purchase can have, 
including the destruction wreaked by conflict, the suffering of millions of people, the 
deaths of hundreds thousands, the billions of dollars of lost development and the high 
cost of conflict resolution.96 It appears a company like De Beers did not consider its 
business activities impact on Angolan war until it withdrew from Angola in the year 
2000, following international pressures.   
The abundance of oil therefore created opportunities for the so-called ‘rent seeking 
behaviour’ by politicians who find themselves with privacy to large amounts of 
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unscrutinised income97, and also offered an opportunity for corrupt business deals 
between MPLA politicians and oil companies.  If oil companies do not reveal how much 
money they are paying the national government, then it is impossible for citizens in 
Angola to find out where this money is going and why it is not being used to their 
benefit.98 Moreover, when oil and mining companies fail to disclose payments to 
governments, it is easier for government officials to steal and difficult for citizens to hold 
officials accountable.99 Oil companies make themselves complicit in the 
disempowerment of ordinary people by failing to tell them what resources are worth.100  
However, what is clearly more amazing is that these are the same companies that publish 
information when they operate in the developed world. Furthermore, the absent of strong 
state institutions to counter corruption created a situation were both companies and 
political elites interact in an irresponsible manner. That was done by means of plundering 
of natural resources from the use of public interest.  
According to Angolan national law, ownership of Angola’s oil and presumably the 
wealth it produces belongs to its citizens.101 Contrary, what is clear visible is that oil and 
diamond wealth has only been to the benefit of companies and the warlords. Although 
Angola earns from $3 billion to $5 billion from oil each year - an estimated 87 percent of 
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state revenue - three-quarters of the population are forced to survive in absolute poverty 
on less than $1 a day.102 
   
Lack of transparency undermines Angolan citizens ability to enjoy their right to 
information as enshrined under article 19 (2) of the International Covenant on Political 
and Civil Rights (ICCPR) that states, everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of 
art, or through any other media of his choice.103 
 
The massive corruption, together with the lack of corporate transparency and 
accountability by oil multinationals such as France’s ElfAcquitaine, the UKs BP-Amaco 
and the US’s Chevron and Exxon/Mobil, whilst the country relies on humanitarian 
assistance, has ensured that remained at lowest rungs of humanitarian development.104  
Corruption leads to a violation of human rights in at least three respects: corruption 
perpetuates discrimination, corruption prevents the full realisation of economic, social, 
and cultural rights, and corruption leads to the infringement of numerous civil and 
political rights.105 Corruption really aggravated social inequalities and upsets the 
equilibrium of all services in Angola because resources that were supposed to be 
channeled into social services ended up in the hands corrupt elites who continued to 
misuse funds.   
                                                 
102
 Simon Taylor, op. cit. 
103
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19(2)  
104
 APIC, ‘Angola: Oil Report, Peace Monitor, 01/08/00 
105
 Peter Eigen Chaiman, ‘Corruption is a Human Rights Issue’ The 2004 Business and Human Rights 
Serminar, Transparency International,  2004  
 http://www.bhrseminar.org/2004%20Documents/Peter_Eigen_09.12.04.doc 
 49 
 
Social services such as health and education are in a state of decay, resulting in 
widespread illiteracy and appalling health conditions.106 Health and education, which are 
pillars for every society, suffered a major blow in the time of conflict. 60 percent of 
hospitals and clinics were destroyed during war, taking a devastating toll on the health 
care system.107 Educational expenditure remained minimal in the years of conflict and 
that could explain that prevalence high rate of illiteracy in the present Angola. 
 
Presently in global politics the word security has drastically changed to embrace human 
security, which is now the core for human rights. Poverty is one aspect that is a threat to 
human security and has been prevalent in Angola. Approximately 70 percent of Angolans 
live in poverty and the ranked 164th out of 175 countries in the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2003 Human Development Index (HDI).108  Oil 
wealth has not ended poverty, more people have gone without many basic necessities, 
even as their oil has generated large sum of profits.   
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion what clearly comes out is that The MPLA would not have been able to 
carry on with conflict without the presence of MNCs. The oil multinationals supported 
corrupt system to function and could not want to publish what they paid to the 
government in exchange of exploring oil resources. The experience of Elf-Aquitaine and 
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the other smaller oil firms demonstrates that specific firms may gain a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis their competitors by brokering and financing arms supplies, 
providing security protection or by becoming associated with such deals. The award of 
such war-related strategies was the acquisition of exclusive oil concessions and 
contracts.109 
 
Oil companies have themselves denied any complicity in the war and have portrayed 
themselves as ‘neutral’ bystanders amidst political turmoil.110 Most of these companies 
take a view that their activities are not political in nature, and are more victims than the 
accomplices of belligerents.111 However, specific oil firms gained a competitive 
advantage owing to the conflict: by being associated with private security interests 
(Heritage Oil), by being able to rely on support of home government officials with 
clandestine links (Elf) or by meditating financial deals for arms purchases (Glencore).112 
These companies know that they could face loss of competitive advantage if the decided 
to be transparence and that action would have rewarded contracts their competitors.  
 
It is quite explicitly that some diamond companies such as De Beers benefited by 
accessing diamond from illegally occupied territory of UNITA. De Beers took advantage 
weaker state institutions that could not govern the whole country because of war. Such 
business transaction between De Beers and the rebel group had an adverse impact on the 
ordinary people of Angola.  
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The disparity between the enormous profits made from mineral resources in Angola by 
foreign corporations, and the social and economic state of the country is an 
uncomplimentary reflection of the role of foreign actors working in the country, and 
reveals once again the international community’s inability to avoid responsibility for the 
problems of a country that they profit from economically.113 The role of financial 
resources generated by foreign companies plays a significant role in the prolonged 
existence of the Angolan conflict. This situation was also exacerbated by lack of strong 
state institutions to regulate both political elites and multinationals operating in Angola. 
The behaviour of oil and diamond companies in Angola has raised interest on issues 
pertaining corporate responsibility especially in conflict-ridden places.  
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Chapter 4 
4 Corporate Accountability in Angola: Ethical 
Considerations of MNCs in Angola. 
  
“The bottom lines of private corporations could no longer be separated from such key 
goals of the United Nations as peace, development and equity” 114 United Nations 
General-Secretary Kofi Annan   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Given the discussions in the last chapter it has been clearly stated that good corporate 
behaviour was mainly undermined by MNCs operating in both oil and diamond sectors. 
Contrary to their stated ethical positions, many of the corporations in Angola failed to 
recognize the business activities impact on the Angolan war economy. Their business 
activities have played a role on sustaining the war. This chapter attempts to discuss issues 
pertaining to ethical behaviour of companies operating in conflict environment such as in 
Angola. The chapter argues that adoptions of Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR) 
could play a crucial role in building peace and ending human rights abuses in Angola, 
especially at this time of post-conflict reconstruction era. 
 
CSR is defined as socially minded behaviour such as respecting human rights, refusing to 
pay bribes, caring for the local communities, and adhering to environmental standards.115 
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Furthermore, the World Bank defines CSR as the commitment of business to contribute 
to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local 
community and society at large to improve their quality of life, in ways that are both 
good for business and good for development.116 What is clearly common in these two 
definitions is that they both highlighting that business has to be responsible and should 
strive to have positive impact in areas they operate.   
 
CSR is a new concept emerging from the general consensus that business community 
needs to conduct their business in a responsible manner. The field of corporate 
responsibility has evolved to include the overall impact of business on society as a 
whole.117 In this new field of CSR companies are expected to evaluate their business 
impact on a society, so that they could minimize negative impacts of their business 
operation. For instance, paying bribes, environmental degradation, and exploiting 
workers, etc.  These are issues that may contribute to human rights violations. 
 
The concept CSR is based on the recognition that businesses are part of society, and that 
they have the potential to make a positive contribution to societal goals and aspirations.118 
CSR is not about companies becoming social organizations but about companies striking 
the balance between bottom line and responsible operation. Even though it is commonly 
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known that business would always strive to achieve their bottom line, there is a general 
consensus that such desire of bottom line should be accompanied by corporate 
responsibility.  
 
4.2 CSR in Conflict Zones  
 
In recent years, there has been a growing convergence among the agendas of CSR, 
human rights, and conflict management around the conduct of extractive industry 
companies in conflict-prone or war-torn countries.119 Such industries are known for 
contributing to human abuses by undermining issues of CSR. As Bennett argues that the 
extractive sector holds tremendous potential for progress in terms of companies 
recognizing and assuming news roles and responsibilities in ways that do not take 
companies to far in the direction beyond their basic business concerns.120 CSR especially 
in conflict zones is about corporations understanding the overall business impact on the 
society as a whole and how business could be a force for good and not add to fuelling 
conflict. This also helps in ensuring that companies are more conflict sensitive. Being 
sensitive to conflict means that corporations need to understand the overall business 
impact on the society as a whole and how their business activities have escalated war 
conflict areas such as Angola. 
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Angola’s abundance of high quality oil and diamonds has drawn the world’s most 
powerful foreign corporations to its shores.121 As shown in previous chapter the foreign 
corporations have triggered the conflict and played a part in prolonging the conflict in 
Angola. Given that situation, it is very important that corporations in Angola should 
adopt CSR that would promote corporate ethics, which could help the country not return 
to the conflict that had severely undermined human security. Both oil and diamond 
companies in Angola appear to have taken a notice to this new concept. This is due to the 
pressure coming from international community, such as UN, World Bank, IMF, and 
human rights groups. 
 
4.3 Corporate Responsibility: What are the Roles of Oil and 
Diamond Companies in Supporting Peace and Development 
in Angola? 
 
Angola has been under reconstruction from the civil war that ended in 2002. Since the 
end of the civil war, the country is still battling with consolidating peace and no 
legitimate party has been elected yet to rule in a democratic manner. For Angola to 
achieve sustainable peace the country also need business actors who could play a very 
positive role in the reconstruction. This is imperative, given negative roles that oil and 
diamond companies played in the civil war of Angola. In other words, corporate practice 
in supporting peace is crucial in Angola.  
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There is a general of consensus that business has a role to play in a sphere of activities 
that remained dominated by civil society and government actors.122 Activities such as 
conflict prevention and resolution, protecting citizens, and social welfare are 
predominately known for civil society organisations and governments. These issues are 
particularly important for companies doing business in conflict prone as Angola. In 
Angola, companies have paid insufficient attention to the ways in which they can impact 
on existing or potential conflict in the country result that their activities have often 
inadvertently augmented rather than diminished tensions.123 This was particularly due to 
the fact that companies paid little attention to adherence to issues of good ethical 
behaviour and corporate governance. 
 
The government and NGOs have already shown a strong involvement in conflict 
transformation but business is still lagging behind although it is also one of the 
stakeholders affected in a conflict of Angola. Stability is crucial for their business and 
security of their investment in Angola. This alone should motivate both oil and diamond 
companies to use their influence in bringing peace and development. While business 
engagement cannot substitute for government action, the business community’s strength 
and influence provide it with the capacity to act independently and to put pressure on a 
government to seek early resolution of a dispute.124 
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A question may arise. Why should business be the part in conflict prevention and 
resolution in Angola? Sustainable development should encompass all stakeholders of the 
society. Companies cannot afford to continue with the notion that business of business is 
business especially those operating in conflict areas. When a company enters a conflict 
zone, it becomes part of the conflict.  
 
In recognizing that they were also part of the conflict, MNCs need also to ensure that 
they are accountable even in post-conflict phase. The issue of corporate accountability is 
crucial in countries that are either emerging from, or are in conflict, and where structures 
of government accountability and transparency are at best fragile, and at worst non-
existence.125 This is what currently comprises the state of Angola. Angola is just 
emerging from a conflict and its governance structure is very weak and corruption is 
prevalent. Given the past negative role of MNCs, emergence of strong viable government 
of Angola will depend on how MNCs are willing to change their dubious character of the 
past. How could companies participate in ensuring peace building and ending human 
rights abuses? There are two ways two ways to answer this question: transparency and 
good governance and by investing in social projects. 
 
4.3.1 Transparency and Good Governance 
 
Since 2003, the Angolan oil industry has been the chief target of an international 
campaign involving governments and civil society in both north and south, and major oil 
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corporations, to establish a framework for more transparency in the extractive 
industries.126 In the past, The British NGO, Global Witness in its report entitled ‘A crude 
Awakening’, criticizes the Angolan government for its handling of oil revenue, and 
accuses the oil companies in Angola of lack of transparency.127 Transparency remains 
one important aspect that needs to come first on oil companies in Angola, given the large 
revenue they make to the government. The published reporting of payments from oil 
companies to the Angolan government could give the population an opportunity to hold 
their government accountable for its misuse of oil revenue.128 As Jackie Cilliers will 
argue that the insistence by some in business that the role of business is to do business’ is 
nonsensical in a country where oil revenue will comprise 90.5% of the 2001 budget of 
about US $3.18 billion.129 If oil companies were required to publish all their payment to 
government, and government to disclose their payments from companies, then Elf system 
could never have come into being.130 Furthermore, if oil payments are made public, the 
citizens of Angola could pressurize the government to invest more on development and 
corruption could be curbed.  
 
Transparency in the diamond sector is still more crucial for consolidating peace and 
should continue to be maintained by diamond companies under Kimberly Process.  There 
is a clear role that De Beers and the CSO should to continue take a lead in transformation 
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because given the scale of their involvement in, and control of the industry, no progress 
can be made without their willing participation.131 
 
The UN panel report on UNITA’s sanctions has found that steps by De Beers in 2000 not 
to purchase UNITA’s diamonds directly or from third parties, and its subsequent 
withdrawal from the diamond market in Angola have made it more difficult for UNITA 
to sell its diamonds; a clear inference that De Beers were buying diamond of UNITA 
origin.132 De Beers’s withdrawal in buying rough diamonds is one of the reasons that 
might have contributed to the defeat of UNITA or that made difficulties for UNITA to 
defeat the MPLA.  
 
One of the important areas to ensure transparency would be through building strong 
partnership with other stakeholders of the society in Angola. High-quality, frequent and 
meaningful engagement with all stakeholders in order to build relationships and to 
determine priority issues around these categories is essential mechanism for enabling 
business to become conflict-sensitive and to fulfill its peace building potential.133 
 
Oil companies in Angola acting alone to encourage host governments to be more 
transparent or to spend more money on health and education and less on the military 
could face competitive disadvantage compared to oil companies that do not try to 
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influence host government.134 What is needed is a collective action among companies 
with the partnership of international organizations such UN, IMF, and the World Bank.  
 
4.3.2 Investing in Social Projects 
 
To date, conflict prevention is most usually defined broadly, to include issues relating to 
the structural drivers of conflict: inequitable economic development, poverty, and neglect 
human rights.135 If peace is to be consolidated in Angola, the living conditions of people 
of Angola need to improve; otherwise the country would face a threat of war again. 
Again in a way of supporting peace, corporations could also invest part of their profits in 
reducing inequalities in areas where they operate in Angola. Companies in Angola cannot 
afford to make huge wealth when people are on the sea of poverty. Over the long term, 
only the private sector is capable of growing new enterprises, opening investment 
opportunities, and providing employment and enduring economic security.136  
 
Oil sector is one most the most biggest and important sector in the economy of Angola. 
Oil production in Angola is the second largest in Africa just after Nigeria. Within this 
industry, about 15 largest foreign companies, including Chevron, TotalFinaElf, Texaco, 
BPAmoco, ExxonMobil, Occidental, Royal Dutch Shell, have invested about US8 billion 
in Angola in 2001.137  Some part of profits from such investment needs to be channeled 
to social projects that could benefit local populations.  
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There is a sign of hope as companies have started investing in some social projects in 
Angola. Since 2003, the World Bank reported that the activities covered a wide variety of 
issues from such areas as general medicine and public health, HIV/Aids prevention, 
micro-credit, community development, staff training, education, humanitarian assistance, 
and the attainment of or progress towards ISO 14000 certification, etc.138  
 
For example, Shell social investment in Angola existed in the form of one-off 
contributions-for instance to a game park, and the UN World Food Programme project 
for Angolan refugees at the Namibian border.139 Even though this social investment 
projects are good, much effort needs to done to give such social investments ownership to 
local populations of Angola. The problem with such corporate social investment is that 
the normally they are conducted in a top-down approach model. Such model could imply 
that there is a little community ownership on decision-making process.  
 
Playing a pro-active role by oil companies would not only benefit people of Angola, but 
also to the benefit of the companies. The oil industry would actually benefit greatly in a 
peaceful environment in Angola. Oil production would no longer face military attack, a 
comprehensive development of onshore oil resources would no longer be delayed and 
Angola’s economic development would provide a more sympathetic business 
environment to operate in.140  
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
In an almost 18 oil companies interviewed by the World Bank in Angola in 2003, the 
Bank has found out that companies have well-developed official statements of corporate 
CSR philosophy which include, inter alia, references to ethical business practices, high 
standards for Health, Safety, and the Environment (HSE), and the pursuit of long-term 
profitability through good corporate citizenship and sustainable business practices.141 In 
an interview with Nkosinathi Ndlovu of Africa Institute for Corporate Citizenship also 
concurred that oil companies seem to have good corporate responsibility statements. 
However the there is still a gap between corporate statements and applicability of such 
CSR especially in the area of full transparency.  
 
The companies need to support full transparency in Angola for the country to continue 
experiencing peace and development. The oil companies who work in Angola, such BP-
Amoco, Elf, Total, Chevron and Exxon and the diamond traders like De Beers, should be 
open with international community and the international financial institutions so that it is 
clear these revenues are not siphoned off but are invested in the country.142 The 
international oil and diamond companies need to realize that they have a role to play in 
assessing the social impact of their activities and insuring that their business operations 
have some positive benefits on the well being of the operating country. That could be 
very possible if companies are adhering to issues of CSR. In the meantime, some people 
are arguing for international regulatory framework instead of relying on voluntary CSR. 
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Chapter 5 
5 Moving Towards a Regulatory Framework for 
Companies: Preventing Corporate Misconduct in 
Angola 
 
“While multinational corporations would prefer to comply through voluntary initiatives, 
the public interest can only be fully served through stronger regulation.”143  Peter Utting, 
UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Is creating an international regulatory framework to regulate MNCs necessary in conflict 
prone countries such as Angola? The answer is definitely yes. For instance, Angolan war 
was also sustained by business activities; Angola is a weak state with weak domestic 
institutions to regulate MNCs, let alone its natural resources, and corruption is 
prevalence, stemming from both government officials and business people.  
 
This chapter argues that the atrocities in Angola would not have occurred if there were 
strong enforcement regulations that corporations could have adhere to.  In this chapter I 
will again argue that since we expect a country in conflict to be in a state of collapse, 
weak governance institutions and regulations, moving towards international regulatory 
framework become a viable option to prevent MNCs negative role, which has been the 
case in Angola.  This chapter would be a way of teasing out the controversial debate 
around self-regulatory mechanism of corporations, which has been arguably ineffective 
in Angola. This chapter wants to highlight the important of international regulatory 
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framework to solve business misconduct in conflict zones by giving empirical evidence 
of Angola. 
 
Furthermore, one of the main reasons behind regulating MNCs is due to the argument 
that private corporations have become increasingly powerful in recent decades, and that 
the result of this increasingly power has been a deterioration of human rights.144 The 
liberalization of world trade and the process has greatly strengthened the comparative 
position of companies.145 The increasing powers of corporations are mainly accompanied 
by the abuse of power and influence.  
 
5.2 The International Law and MNCs in Zones of Conflict. 
         
To start with, what is the position of international law on MNCs that contribute to human 
rights abuses, especially in conflict zones like in Angola? The international law does 
regulate MNCs directly but does indirectly through nation states. Under international law, 
states usually enter into international treaties that also include business treaties such as 
business and corruption. Instead such treaties do not purport to impose obligations 
directly on corporations.146 Such obligations are never imposed by treaty itself, only by 
the domestic legal provision- be it statutory or constitutional- that gives the treaty 
domestic legal force.147  
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The fact that such treaties are not directly applicable to non-state actors (as MNCs) is a 
reflection of the oft-misunderstood proposition that states have been the subjects of 
international law.148 By so doing the international law is failing to recognize the fact that 
non-state actors such as MNCs have become powerful actors in the domain of 
international relations. Again, the classical model appears to disfavor states by subjecting 
them to international obligations and responsibility, and to favor non-state actors by 
leaving them unregulated.149 
 
Moreover, in international law, there is no general rule that states that companies are 
responsible for their international wrongful acts.150 Kamminga asked a very fundamental 
question that ‘why should individual and opposition groups have fundamental 
international legal obligations while companies that may be much more powerful have 
practically none.’151 Today, in the era of increasing globalisation of capital and cross-
border operation of all major corporations, concerned citizens are again raising the issues 
of international norms and rules.152 While more and more economic activity takes place 
on an international basis, global society has been slow to build a new rule-based global 
economic system.153 Transnational corporate or investment rules and regulations, drafted 
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by an inter-governmental process, could offer a stronger approach to corporate 
accountability.154  
 
International norm that operate on corporations but are not backed by sanctions are very 
likely to be violated. There is a need for international law to move in the direction of 
imposing obligations directly on corporations.155 International initiatives discussed above 
showed that they are not effective means to ensure that corporations operate in an 
unharmful way to the society where they operate, especially in conflict zones. The reality 
is that without legal ramifications to change their practices, MNCs have little reason or 
incentive to codes of conduct, or abide by such codes if they already in place.156  
 
In the absence of international regulatory framework, the prevailing view that controls 
MNCs is through CSR, which is basically a voluntary mechanism. This approach is most 
strongly and supported by the corporate sector. As a common preference, MNCs prefer to 
carry on their business without any regulatory oversight.  I will start by highlighting some 
of the voluntary international initiatives that attempt to regulate MNCs. I will argue that 
those initiatives are creating a room for the establishment of international regulatory 
framework, which could a positive signs to prevent corporate misconduct in places like 
Angola.  
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5.3 Some of Current Existing International Initiatives that Strive 
to Regulate MNCs  
 
5.3.1 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
 
The OECD guidelines for MNCs were firstly adopted in 1976 and were revised in the 
year 2000 of which 33 governments are members. The guidelines adopted by the 
Committee on International Investments and Multinational Enterprises (CIME). The 
adhering governments are home to the majority of MNCs in the world today. The new 
revision reinforces the economic, social and environment elements of the sustainable 
development.157  The guidelines are recommendations addressed by governments that 
corporations are supposed to adhere when doing their business operations in foreign 
countries. The guidelines outline following issues among others that corporation should 
pursue: striving for transparency, applying proper regulations on employment and 
industries relations, respect the environment, combating bribery, respecting consumer 
interests, etc. The principal rule is that business should respect national laws and 
regulations and practice responsible corporate conduct across all operations.158 
 
 The guidelines aim to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with 
government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises 
and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate 
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and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational 
enterprises.159 
 
How are these guidelines implemented? According to the implementations procedures, 
adhering governments shall set up National Contact Points (NCP) to undertake 
promotional activities, handle enquiries, and facilitate dialogue between parties 
concerned on all matters covered by the guidelines.160 The NCPs are supposed to 
maintain a strong communication with CIME in terms of implementations of the 
guidelines by reporting annually. CIME serves as a secretariat to the guidelines and is 
responsible for periodic reviews and for assisting the NCPs with interpretation and 
clarification when necessary.161 
 
5.3.2 Are OECD guidelines related to MNCs in conflict areas?  
 
The crucial question is how relevant are the guidelines to companies in conflict zones. As 
a general debate on corporate social responsibility has evolved, MNCs have experienced 
increasing scrutiny of their activities in troubled areas.162 However the guidelines 
themselves did not make any reference or addressed issues concerning companies 
operating in conflict zones. 
 
Conflict situations are not mentioned in particular, but the foreword states that 
corporations are agents for positive change throughout the developed as well as the 
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developing world. And again, there are some aspects that are particularly relevant even 
for companies operating in conflict zones. For example the guidelines do highlights 
issues such as corruption, disclosure, the environment and human rights. 
 
To look at how the guidelines are relevant in conflict areas, firstly there is an issue of 
respecting local legislation by companies in host states. This is important for companies 
operating in conflict zones because countries at war may have limited enforcement.163 
The guidelines impose on companies not to take advantage of the fog of war or a power 
vacuum, but to respect national legislation even if enforcement capacity is absent.164 
 
One other thing that the guidelines emphasized is transparency. Transparency is of 
immense importance when operating in conflict zones because it may prevent illegal or 
irresponsible conduct related to any issue, be it corruption, tax evasion, trading in illicit 
goods, human rights abuses or violation of any laws and regulations.165 In the case of 
Angola, lack of transparency especially in oil sector has been distractive to that country.  
 
Corruption and bribery is also mentioned in the guidelines. Corruption is one of many 
destructive effects typically resulting in conflict. Countries plagued by conflicts often 
lack functioning democratic institutions and free press, which under normal 
circumstances deal with or reveal corruption.166 The guidelines emphasized that 
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companies should not, directly or indirectly, offer, promise, give, or demand a bribe or 
other undue advantage to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage.167 
 
Finally, one can argue that the main problem with the guidelines is that they do not target 
MNCs directly, but mostly target the adhering members to make corporations more 
accountable. The other major flaw is that the guidelines become less important if MNCs 
are operating in non-member countries especially developing countries such as those in 
Africa.  
 
5.3.3 UN Norms on Business and Human Rights 
 
The UN norms have been drafted in 2003 and were supposed to be examined for 
adoption by UN Commission on Human Rights in 2004 but are still yet to be further 
reviewed as a result of opposition from corporate lobby. UN norms states that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society are also 
responsible for promoting and securing the human rights as set forth in the UDHR. The 
main aim of the norms is to bring business community to be accountable on aspects of 
human rights. 
 
They also noted that the new international human rights issues and concerns are 
continuing emerging and that transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
often are involved in these issues and concerns, such that further standard-setting and 
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implementation are required and this time and in the future168 This is particularly relevant 
companies operating in conflict areas like Angola, to ensure that MNCs do not violate 
human rights with their activities. 
 
The norms recognize that transnational corporations and other business enterprises have 
the capacity to foster economic well-being, development, technological improvement and 
wealth as well as the capacity to cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of 
individuals through their core business practices and operation.169  
 
The norms are also more applicable to companies in conflict zones as similar to OECD 
guidelines. For example, the norms states that transitional enterprises and other business 
enterprises shall recognize and respect applicable norms of international law, the public 
interest, development objectives, social, economic and cultural policies including 
transparency, accountability and prohibition of corruption, and authority of the countries 
in which they operate.170   
 
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not offer, promise, give, 
accept, condone, knowingly benefit from, or demand a bribe or other improper 
advantage, nor shall they be solicited or expected to give a bribe or other improper 
advantage to any government, public official, and candidate for elective post, any 
member of the armed forces, or other individual or organization.171 Furthermore, 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall refrain from any activity, 
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which supports, solicits, or encourage states or any other entities to abuse human 
rights.172 
 
Their suggestion in terms of implementation is one that can ensure effective compliance 
or enforcement. The norms want to provide effective means of monitoring rather than 
relying on self-regulatory means of corporations. It states that transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises shall be subject to periodic monitoring and verification by 
the United Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in existence or 
yet to be created, regarding application of norms.173  This monitoring shall be transparent 
and independent and take into account input from stakeholders (including non-
governmental organizations) as a result of complaints of violations of these norms. 174 
 
The rejection of the norms by corporate lobby posses many questions as to whether 
companies are ready to reform the way they operate particularly in developing countries. 
One of the arguments by business community was the claim that the UN Norms would 
represent a fundamental shift in responsibility for protecting human rights –from 
governments to private actors, including companies-effectively privatizing the 
enforcement of human rights.175 However business should not be so naïve to recognize 
that they have a role to play in protecting human rights. The issue is not about privatizing 
human rights issues but ensuring that business as one of stakeholders in a society is 
operating in a responsible manner.   
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5.3.4 Kimberly Process 
 
In a concerted response, the international community led by the UN, initiated certain 
measures and steps culminating in the adoption of what is known as Kimberley Process 
for the certification of Rough Diamonds.176 The Kimberly Process was named after its 
first meeting in 2000 in Kimberly, South Africa. The main objective of the Scheme is to 
eliminate or reduce the role of such diamonds in fuelling conflicts in Africa by 
eradicating trade in conflict diamonds to cut off the source of funding for the purchase of 
arms and ammunition by the rebels.177 Rebel groups in Africa used rough diamonds to 
finance the rebellions and wars against legitimate governments and to inflict unspeakable 
brutalities against innocent, civilian populations.178 
 
Collaboration between UN, diamond dealers and companies, diamond producing 
countries and other stakeholders has introduced Certificate of origins that identifies 
legitimate diamonds from illegal ones. According to the Process, diamond dealers and 
companies need to buy rough diamonds accompanied by certificate from the producers. 
Diamond dealers and companies are needed to produce that certificate when trading their 
diamonds on the international market. More than 50 nations have already signed the 
Kimberly Process measures around the globe. 
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It is clear that the creation and implementation of the Kimberly process was significant 
step in addressing the important humanitarian and security problems associated with 
conflict diamonds.179 International action to restrict UNITA’s diamond trade does seem 
to have been relatively successful in limiting the supply of funds to the organization 
(from $700 million in 1996 to $100 million in 2002), and may have contributed to its 
recent defeat.180 One could simply point it out that Kimberly process was a success in 
Angola because of effective measures that do not rely on voluntary measures.   
 
5.3.5 NGO’s Initiatives 
 
This is a new trend in the field of International Relations whereby NGOs such as Global 
Witness, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Alert, etc. are 
criticizing openly unethical acts of corporations especially in conflict prone areas, so that 
corporations may ensure compliance. It also involves NGOs articulating standards of 
corporate behaviour by NGOs and monitoring compliance, enabling the ultimate 
“enforcement” of such standards through consumer boycotts and more generally through 
shaming techniques.181 The Kimberly Process also came into being through the efforts of 
NGOs. Starting from the year 2000, it was a collection of NGOs, such as Global Witness, 
World Vision, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, Partnership 
Africa Canada, and Human Rights Watch- who deserve credit for bringing the problem of 
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conflict diamonds to the world’s attention and highlighting the misery that was a product 
of the conflict diamonds trade.182   
 
The problem with this approach is that the stipulated standards are again to be 
implemented by such states that are corrupt without international obligation. Some of the 
critic is that most human rights NGOs are based in developed countries and obtain their 
resources from in such countries.183 Their long-term survival depends on the willingness 
of such countries to fund their operations. 
 
5.4 Moving Towards International Regulatory Framework for 
Corporations in Conflict Zones: Why is Necessary in 
Conflict-ridden Countries such as Angola?   
 
How could moving towards international regulatory prevent corporate misconduct in 
conflict-ridden countries such as Angola? Given the background of some of the 
international initiatives discussed above, it seems to be quite clear that there is already a 
strong foundation that has been laid for international regulations. Unless an international 
legal framework is strengthened to stop the deadly complicity of private commercial 
actors, warlords and governments benefiting from war economies will continue to 
thrive.184 
 
Firstly, international regulations are needed to beef up national structures to regulate 
MNCs in Angola. A country in conflict situation cannot provide viable controls on MNCs 
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operating on its shores. Depending on the laws of a particular country, host governments 
theoretically could impose requirements unilaterally on MNCs based within their 
jurisdiction.185 This is quiet problematic, because in a case of Angola, it is quiet clearly 
that the very host government happened to be a corrupt regime that has actually 
continued with human rights violation in partnership with the oil multinationals. 
Moreover, due to lack of proper regulations some MNCs operated illegitimate territories, 
which was under the rebels group. In Angola, UNITA faction managed to enter into 
business deals with some diamond companies such as De Beers and De Decker. 
Enforceable sanctions are needed to regulate the transactions between MNCs and rebel 
groups, if war economies such that occurred in Angola are to be curtailed or effectively 
reformed.186 Enforceable sanctions are not only needed to regulate business transactions 
between MNCs and rebel groups, but also with corrupt regimes such as MPLA.   
 
Others observe that, even if the host state has adequate laws on the books to protect its 
citizens’ welfare, they often lack the resources to enforce those laws effectively.187 Still 
Vazquez argues that in many developing countries, government corruption will result 
either inadequate laws or ineffective enforcement of adequate laws.188 This has been the 
case in Angola. An accountability gap then occurs if the host states are either unable or 
unwilling to hold companies to reasonable minimum standards.189 Furthermore, 
developing countries cannot always be counted on to protect the interests of their citizens 
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in circumstances because the governments such countries are often dysfunctional.190 The 
international regulatory framework could have been so crucial in such a situation. Armed 
conflicts and repressive or neglectful governance will continue as long as businesses 
sustain flows of resources without being held accountable to host populations.191 
 
Secondly, international regulatory framework is necessary to force MNCs to adopt CSR. 
Contrary to their stated ethical positions, many foreign corporations in Angola failed to 
recognize their business activities impact on the conflict. Due to weak governance most 
oil and diamond companies did not even bother to adhere to corporate ethics. Embracing 
this behaviour was largely due to the fact that CSR remains on voluntary basis and do not 
bind corporations.  This of course somehow makes compliance difficult, as there are no 
binding regulations. Voluntary codes are often vague statements of principle that cannot 
provide reliable guidelines for behaviour in concrete situations.192 Moving towards 
international regulatory framework could be one of effective mechanism to ensure 
compliance in conflict-ridden countries such as Angola. Although many corporations 
have adopted codes of conduct and social responsibility policy, few include human rights 
standards, most lack implementation measures and independent audits that verify their 
stated achievements.193 Furthermore, Corporations do not adopt codes unless faced with 
public pressure and negative publicity.194  
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Thirdly, international regulatory framework is necessary because corporations adopting 
ethical codes of conduct are likely to consider themselves to be at competitive 
disadvantage if they actually put codes into practice in Angola, especially oil 
multinationals. This is one of the reasons why oil companies in Angola had to enter into 
brokering arms deals. There was huge competition among companies to access oil 
deposits.  No company wanted to be excluded because of practicing corporate ethics. Any 
attempt to force the oil companies to make oil companies’ payments public would have to 
be imposed internationally, as no company will relinquish it competitive edge in order to 
comply for transparency.  
 
Furthermore, if there is going to be a ‘level playing field’, which prevents good 
performers being undercut by bad performers, then an international regulatory framework 
for an essentially transitional business will ultimately be necessary.195  For instance, 
When BP wanted to publish all their payments to the Angolan government, the 
government threatened to suspend the company from doing business in Angola. In 2001, 
BP stated that in addition to maintaining a dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions 
over the situation in Angola, it would publish key financial data regarding its 
operations.196 Such a great movement was blocked and business continued as usual. The 
establishment of common standards for business engagement in fragile, corrupt and war-
torn societies where governance is weak and predatory is necessary to prevent such 
instances.197 
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Fourthly, Multinationals often argue that the laws of their country of origins or stock 
market listing bind them, and that the obligation is on those governments and institutions 
to regulate, restrict or limit their activity.198 It seems unlikely that home countries would 
altruistically impose regulations to their corporations for the benefit of foreign nationals, 
placing their corporations at a disadvantage compared to local businesses or MNCs based 
elsewhere.199 One must bear in mind that MNCs are part of governments’ national 
interest in foreign countries. They are normally used for both economic and political 
influence in foreign countries. The furtility or impropriety of relying on home country 
law and institutions to protect the human rights of host country nationals should shift a 
focus on international regulation and institutions as a form of protection.200 Parent 
countries are unlikely to put their corporations on competitive disadvantage by enforcing 
them to tight regulations. That never happened in Angola. Parent countries never paid 
attention on misconduct of their corporations and Angola suffered.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Finally, the regulation of corporate activities involved in war economies offers a major 
avenue for conflict prevention and peace building.201 There is a clear need for a 
regulatory framework and instruments of enforcement to influence the behaviour of 
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businesses in relation to conflicts.202 Some of the atrocities committed in Angola would 
have been prevented if there were clear regulatory framework for companies investing in 
that country. Furthermore, the Kimberly process on conflict diamonds is a major step 
towards an international regulatory trade regime over commodities involved in war 
economies.203 It has been a success story. The funds stemming from selling conflict 
diamond has been curbed in Angola. More needs to be done in other natural resources. 
The oil sector also needs a regulatory regime to curb war economies.   
 
 
 Le Bellion outline three major areas that regulatory framework could revolve around: 
first, prohibition of corporate activities benefiting from the violation of human rights and 
humanitarian laws, secondly, prevention of corporate investment in conflict-affected 
areas likely to aggravate hostilities and their humanitarian impact, and lastly, promotion 
of greater transparency and accountability in terms of fiscal transfers and security 
arrangements.204  
 
Cilliers also argues that international community should examine the establishment of a 
legal regulatory framework for businesses in war – including a permanent UN sanction 
monitoring mechanism, an investigation and international warrant capacity under 
Interpol, and a universal jurisdiction held by the International Criminal Court (ICC).205 
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However, the question remains, will there be a willingness and coordination among 
various stakeholders, such as corporations, host and parent governments, NGOs, and 
governmental organizations? However moving towards international binding regulations 
for corporations is necessary to curb war economies. Moreover it is necessary to 
governments such as Angola experiencing weak governance institutions to regulate 
multinationals.  
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Chapter 6 
6 Conclusion 
MNCs have become major actors in global affairs. A process of globalisation accelerated 
their rapid expansion in global affairs.  This rapid expansion of globalization after World 
War II was made possible by institutions of global economic governance, which emerged 
after the war, such as IMF, World Bank and GATT, which in 1995 became WTO. MNCs 
have taken an advantage of such a process. They have continued to expand beyond 
borders of nations in large numbers. The developing nations such as in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America have also felt the presence of MNCs.   
 
However, their influence has not only gone to places that are experiencing sound political 
stability. They have also gone to places in developing countries that are experiencing 
political instability. The focus of MNCs in areas experiencing political instability has 
been on natural resource based corporations. These corporations are known to invest in 
such areas. With such an investment in unstable regions, international business 
community have found itself confronted with many challenges in its areas of operation, 
or being blamed for contributing to the conditions that lead to violent conflict.206 
Consequently, an increasing amount of attention has been focused on the links between 
conflict and the activities of MNCs, and the role corporations play in conflicts.207 
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 Mainly, this study focused on MNCs that are natural resource based, locating them in a 
country experiencing a civil war. Specifically, the study focused on the role of oil and 
diamond companies during the Angolan civil war and how their business activities 
contributed to human rights violations. 
 
What clearly comes out from the research is that Angolan natural resource based 
multinationals particularly those in diamond and oil sectors had adverse influence by 
contributing to the sustainability of that civil conflict. In such a process, Angolans have 
been forced to endure human sufferings. The human suffering included, loss of life, the 
collapsed of the economy that accelerated poverty, deteriorates health care and education.   
The Angolan people have been systematically abused in favour of corporate profits and 
personal gain by the warlords of both warring parties. During the years of conflict, 
Angola has been characterized by a state of rapacious national elites to pillage the 
country’s resources with the assistance of several multinational corporations, such as Elf, 
De Beers, Chevron, Glencore, Statoil, etc. 
 
The presence of oil companies in Angola played a supporting role to the MPLA regime 
towards its efforts of defeating UNITA rebel group. The activities of foreign oil 
companies have affected the shape of the conflict; the intense competition for oil 
concessions has led to a number of different companies seeking the favour of the Angolan 
state elites through dubious charitable donations, weapons deals, and other forms of 
assistance.208 The relationship between oil companies and the government was basically 
corrupt. There was no transparency. Oil companies do not reveal figures of their payment 
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to the government. Corruption leads to a violation of human rights in at least three 
respects: corruption perpetuates discrimination, corruption prevents the full realisation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, and corruption leads to the infringement of 
numerous civil and political rights.209 Corruption really aggravated social inequalities and 
upsets the equilibrium of all services in Angola because resources that were supposed to 
be channeled into social services ended up in the hands corrupt elites who continued to 
misuse funds.   
 
Due to weaker institutions of governance, some places where the natural resources are 
exploited are under control of the rebel groups. This gives a room for rebel groups to 
exploit natural resources and enter into business transactions with MNCs. This situation 
allows chaos and creates an environment that exacerbates conflict. UNITA rebel faction 
has been able to carry on with waging war since 1992-2002, through illegal exploitation 
of diamond on illegally occupied territories. The control of 70% of diamond territories 
made it possible for UNITA to enter into trade or business transactions with some 
diamond dealers and companies such as De Beers. Much of the revenue accrued was 
crucial for buying weapons and supporting war related activities of UNITA. 
 
Even though companies in Angola claim that good corporate standards are core to their 
business activities, they are unlikely to be implemented especially in conflict zones where 
there are not strong institutions of governance. Weak institutions are one of the factors 
that contribute to corruption in collapsed states. In fact high-rise of corruption in Angola 
made both MPLA officials to enter into corrupt business deals with oil companies.  
                                                 
209
 Peter Eigen Chaiman, op. cit. 
 85 
 
It is quite clear those business activities by MNCs in areas where there are human rights 
abuses especially in conflict zones could directly and indirectly contribute to human 
rights abuses if they are not regulated.  
 
What is the way forward? The main challenge among oil and diamond companies in 
Angola is to manage the direct and indirect impacts to maintain transparency in all 
dealings with the government and local community. Furthermore, moving towards 
international regulatory framework could be a viable option to prevent negative role of 
MNCs in areas experiencing instabilities. The international community needs to establish 
regulations regarding transparency of financial exchange between corporations, rebel 
groups and governments.210 Such international framework needs to be accompanied by 
effective regulations such as sanctions to ensure compliance. International norm that 
operate on corporations but are not backed by effective regulations such, as sanctions are 
very likely to be violated. Moreover, regulations should ensure that MNCs are signed up 
to the binding human rights agreements and follow the codes of conducts concerning 
their operations in conflict countries.211 
 
The success around curbing conflict diamonds in Angola was due to the international 
regulatory body in a form of Kimberly Certification Process. The body combined 
voluntary mechanisms with enforcement mechanisms such sanctions, which have been 
effective. Voluntary measures alone are not effective because companies are unlikely to 
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implement them unless they are faced criticisms faced with public pressure and negative 
publicity.  
 
Given the background of some of the international initiatives discussed in chapter 4, it 
seems that there is already a stronger foundation to establish common international rules, 
although those initiatives are governed by voluntary measures. It shows that there is a 
growing consensus that corporations need to be regulated internationally. Such a 
consensus needs to be put forward to come up with enforcement mechanisms to govern 
corporations. 
 
Presently in the absence of international binding rules of MNCs, both diamond and oil 
companies need to ensure that adherence to their corporate social responsibilities in 
Angola. That could also help in ensuring transparency, which is still a major problem in 
Angola. There is a need for companies to ensure that their business operation is 
conducted in a responsible manner especially where governance is weak such as in 
Angola. The most emerging issue coming from the research is that, days are gone where 
MNCs are just merely business actors. MNCs should strive to place themselves political, 
economic and social context of the country in which they operate. Business actors have a 
role to play and do have a capacity to be a force for good.   
 
Governments, NGOs and civil society have shown to play positive role that uplift human 
security issues on issues related to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, 
but business society seem to be lagging behind in such issues. Even if they are operating 
 87 
in places surrounded by conflict or in war torn countries. However, given the limited 
resources of governments, one could argue that business has a very crucial role in conflict 
prevention and resolutions because of their large pool of profit they make. Some part of 
profit they make could sponsor peace deals and for humanitarian welfare. Finally, MNCs 
in extractive sector have become strong actors in conflict zones; the positive role of such 
MNCs in conflict zones such as Angola is crucial for sustainable peace and uplifting of 
human rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
Bibliography 
 
Books 
Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J. (eds) The Political Economy of an Armed Conflict: 
Beyond Greed and Grievance, Lynne Rienner Publishing, London, 2003 
 
Banon, I. and Collier, P. (eds) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and 
Actions, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2003 
 
Beaudent, P.R. et al (eds) Angola 1991: UN Pays a Refaire, Cidmaa, Montreal, 1991 
 
Bhagwati, J.N. (eds) Economics and World Order: from the 1970’s to the 1990’s, 
Macmillan, New York, 1972 
 
Cilliers, J and Dietrich, C. (eds) Angola’s War Economy: the Role of Oil and Diamonds 
Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000.  
 
Doughorthy, J.E and Pfaltzgraff, Contending theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1981. 
 
Gozana, N. Angola: A Brief Survey, Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1967 
 
Grobbelaar, N. Angola: Prospects for Peace and Prosperity, South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2003. 
 
Haufter, V., Croker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P.(eds) The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2001. 
 
Henderson, L.W. Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1979 
 89 
Hodges, T. Angola’s Anatomy of an Oil State, James Currery, Oxford, 2003 
 
Hodges, T. Angola: from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-diamond Capitalism, James Currery, 
Oxford, 2001 
 
McCormick, S.H. The Angolan Economy: Prospects for Growth in a Postwar 
Environment, Center for Strategic and International Affairs, Washington D.C.1994 
 
Nelson, J. The Business of Peace: Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution, International Alert, London, 2000 
 
Richardson, P. Corporate Crime in a Globalized Economy: An Examination of the 
Corporate Legal Conundrum and Positive Prospects for Peace, Carleton University, 
Ottawa, 2003  
 
Reno, W., (eds) ‘The Real War Economy in Angola’ in Angola’s War Economy, 2000,  
 
Ross, L.M., (eds) ‘Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in 
Civil War,’ in The Political Economy of an Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance, Lynne Rienner Publishing, London, 2003 
 
Wenger, A. and Mockli, D, Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business 
Sector, Lynne Riener, London, 2003 
 
Virmani, K.K. (eds) Angola and the Superpowers, University of Delhi, Delhi, 1989 
 
Journals 
Allan Gerson, ‘Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role’ The American Journal of 
International Law, No. 102 Vol. 1, The American Society of International Law, 
Washington D.C., 2001 
 90 
 
Ballentine, K. and Nitzschke, H., ‘Business and Armed Conflict: An Assessment of 
Issues and Options,’ in Journal of International Peace and Security No. 79 Vol.1-2, Die 
Frieden-Warke, New York, 2004 
 
Berman, J., ‘Boardrooms and Bombs: Strategies of Multinational Corporations in 
Conflict Areas,’ in Harvard International Review, No.3 Vol.22, Harvard University 
Press, Harvard, 2000 
 
Booth, K., ‘A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations,’ in South 
African Perspectives No.30, Center for Southern African Studies, Bellville, 1994 
 
Cain, A., ‘Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders? in Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001 
 
Cilliers, J. ‘Business and War,’ in African Security Review No.3 vol.10, Institute of 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 2001. 
 
Cilliers, J. ‘Business and War in Angola,’ in Review of African Political Economy, No. 
90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001. 
  
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. ‘On Economic Causes of War,’ in Oxford Economic Papers 
No.4 Vol. 50, Oxford University press, London, 1998 
 
Cooper, N., ‘The Business of War: How not to Downsize,’ in Conflict, Security & 
Development, Journal No.2 Vol.3, Centre for Defense Studies, Carfax Publishing                                 
Kings College, London, 2002 
 
De Boeck, F. ‘Garimpeiro ‘Worlds: Digging, Dying & ‘Hunting’ for Diamonds in 
Angola,’ in Review of African Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 
2001. 
 91 
 
Frynas, J.G. and Wood, G. ‘Oil and War in Angola,’ in Review of African Political 
Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001. 
 
Gerson, A. ‘Peace: Private Sector’s Role,’ American Journal of International Law No.1 
Vol. 94, The American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., 2001. 
 
Harsch, E. ‘Africa, Asia and Anxieties about Globalisation,’ in Review of African 
Political Economy No.79 Vol. 26,  Carfax Publishers, UK,1999 
 
Kibble, S. & Vines, A., ‘Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society,’ in Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001. 
 
Le Billion, P., ‘Thriving on War: The Angolan Conflict & Private Business,’ in Review of 
African Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001, 
 
Lwanda, G., ‘Conflict Diamonds and the African ‘resource curse’ Conflict Trends No. 4, 
ACCORD, Durban, 2003 
 
Malaquis, A., ‘Making War & Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted 
Conflict in Angola,’ in Review of African Political Economy, No. 90 vol. 28, Carfax 
Publishers, UK, 2001. 
 
Power, M., ‘Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the 
Economics of War in Angola,’ in Review of African Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, 
Carfax Publishers, UK, 2001. 
 
Simon, D., ‘The Bitter Harvest of War: Continuing Social & Humanitarian Dislocation in 
Angola,’ in Review of African Political Economy, No. 90 vol.28, Carfax Publishers, UK, 
2001 
 
 92 
Sullivan, R., ‘Human Rights and Companies in Conflict Zones,’ in Conflict, Security & 
Development Vol.3 No.2, Centre for Defense Studies, Kings College, London, 2003, 
 
 Udoufia, O.E., ‘Imperialism in Africa: A Case of Multinational Corporations’ Journal of 
Black Studies, Vol. 14, No.3, Sage, London,1984 
 
 
Internet Sources 
Action for Southern Africa, ‘United Nations Report Exposes Arms-for-Diamonds 
Scandal’ Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 7, Vol. VI, 2000  
http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0607.html 
 
 
Akindele, S.T., Gidado, T.O., and Olaopo, O.R., ‘Globalisation, Its Implications and 
Consequences for Africa’ Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo 
University, Nigeria, 2002 
http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.1/01_akindele_etal.html 
 
Bhagwati, J. ‘Do Multinational  Corporations Hurt Poor Countries’ 2004, accessible from 
Http://www.taemag.com/doc/lib/2004.04.05-june04bhagwati. pdf 
 
Banfield, J. and Champain, P., ‘What Role for Oil Majors in Supporting Sustainable 
Peace and Development in Angola?: A Survey of Stakeholder Perspectives, International 
Alert, London, 2004, 
http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/role_oil_majors_angola.pdf 
 
Bennett, J. ‘Business in Zones of Conflict: The Role of Multinational in Promoting 
Regional Stability,’ International Pearce Forum Paper, New York, 2001 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org//Dialogue/ PolicyDialogues2002/ZonesOfConflict/pdf 
 
Berdal, M. and Malome, D.M.,  ‘Economic Agendas in Civil war’, World Institute for 
Development Economic Research Paper, UN University Press, Tokyo, 2005 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/dps2005/dp2005-07.pdf 
 93 
 
Bindenagel, J.D. ‘Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme’ 
Conference Paper, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, 2003 
http://www.ccfr.org/remarks/pdf03/conflict%20diamonds.pdf 
 
Bruderhein, C., ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The Case of 
Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2000 
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/report_may2000_2-e.php 
 
 
Campbell, A. ‘The Private Sector and Conflict Prevention Mainstreaming: Risk Analysis 
and Conflict Impact Assessment Tools for Multinational Corporations, Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy, Carleton University, Canada, 2002 
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/mncsriskassessmentreportupdated.pdf 
 
Christiansen, A.C. ‘Beyond Petroleum: Can BP Deliver? FNI Report 6, Fridtjof Nansens 
Institutt, Norway, 2002 
 http://www.fni.no/pdf/FNI-R0602.pdf 
 
Committee for Conflict Transformation Support ‘Engaging the Private Sector in Conflict 
Transformation: An Overview of Possibilities and Challenges’ CCTS Newsletter 19, 2005 
 http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts19/private.htm 
 
Cooper, N., ‘The Business of War’, Ploughshares Monitor,  London, 2002. 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/monotor/mons02h.html 
 
Eigen, P., ‘Corruption is a Human Rights Issue’ The 2004 Business and Human Rights 
Serminar, Transparency International, London, 2004  
 http://www.bhrseminar.org/2004%20Documents/Peter_Eigen_09.12.04.doc 
 
 94 
Fafo IAS and International Peace Academy, ‘Business and International Crimes: 
Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International Law’, 
Oslo, 2004.http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/ 
 
Feeney, P., ‘The Relevance of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the 
Mining Sector and the Promotion of Sustainable Development’, Oxford, 2002 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/4/1819638.pdf 
 
Global Witness, A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in 
Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets,’ London, 1999 
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00048.pdf 
 
Global Witness, ‘Elf Vedict Jails the Guilty, but Their Bitter Legacy Remains’ press 
statement, London, 2003 
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=226 
 
Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the 
Angolan Conflict”, London, 1999 
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00103.pdf 
 
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Implementing the Kimberly Process: 5 
Years on- How Effective is the Kimberly Process and What Needs to be Done? Global 
Witness Publishing, Washington, 2005 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC18646.htm 
 
Human Rights Watch, “The IMF and Angola: Oil and Human Rights” HRW World 
Report, New York, 2000. 
http://www.hwr.org/press/2000/06/ang0622.htm 
 
Human Rights Watch ‘Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue 
in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights’ Vol. 16, No. 1,  New York, 2004  
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/ 
 95 
 
Human Rights Watch, “The International Monetary Fund’s Staff Monitering Program for 
Angola: The Human Rights Implications” HRW World Report, 2000. 
http://www.hwr.org/press/2000/06/ang0623-back.htm 
 
Huser, A., ‘Doing Business in Conflict Zones: Implementing the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, Paper for WIDER Conference, United Nations University, 
Helsinki, June 2004 accessible http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2004-
1/conference%202004-1-papers/Huser-0906.pdf 
 
 
IRIN, ‘Angola: New Report Alleges Blood Still Stains Diamonds’, 10 March 2005 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp 
 
Jung, K. M. ‘Deciding Whether to Do Business in States with Bad Governments’, Danish 
Centre for Human Rights Paper, Denmark, 2001. 
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/pdf_files/supplimentry.pdf 
 
Kamminga, M. T., ‘Corporate Obligations under International Law’ The Paper presented 
at 71st International Law Association Conference, Berlin, 2004 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/kamminga.doc 
 
Klein, M. and Harford, T. ‘Corporate Responsibility: When Will Voluntary Reputation 
Building Improve Standard’ Public Policy for the Private Sector Paper, World Bank, 
2004, http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/271-klein-harford.pdf 
 
Le Billion, P., ‘War Economies, Corporate Responsibility and Regulatory Instruments’,  
http://www.humansecurity.info/pdf/le-billion-pdf 
 
Nelson, J. ‘The Business of Peace: Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution’, http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_1pubs.htm 
 96 
 
OECD, ‘Multinational Enterprises in Situations of Violent Conflict and Human Rights 
Abuses’, Working Papers on International Investment, No.1/2002/ Paris, 2002 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/31/2757771.pdf 
 
 
OECD, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ Revision Paper, Paris, 
2000 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
Paul, J.A and Garred, J. ‘Making Corporations Accountable: A Background Paper for the 
Financing for Development Process’, Global Policy Forum, New York, 2000 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/2000papr.htm - 77k 
 
Palley, T.I. “Publish What You Pay: Confronting Corruption and the Natural Resource 
Curse’ Open Society Institute, New York, 2003 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/article.../publishpay-
20030304?skin=printtab1 
 
 
Sherman, J., ‘Options for Promoting Corporate social Responsibility in Conflict Zones: 
Perspectives from the Private Sector’, International Peace Academy Report, New York, 5 
April 2002 
http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/ Corporate-Responsibility.pdf 
 
Sherman, J., ‘Private Sector Actors in Zones of conflict: Research Challenges and Policy 
Responses’, International Peace Academy, New York, April 2001 
http://www.fafo.no/nsp/ipa-report.pdf 
 
Smith, D., ‘Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries’, 
International Alert, London, UK, March 2005 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/security_ conflict_sensitive_business.pdf 
 97 
 
Susan Pinkney, ‘Mind Your Own Business: Multinational Corporations, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Conflict, 2005 
http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/S_Pinkney.doc 
 
Swanson, P., ‘Fuelling Conflict: The oil Industry and Armed Conflict’ Programme for 
International Co-operation and Conflict Resolution FAFO-Report 387, FAFO Institute 
for Applied Social Science, Oslo, 2002 
http://www.fafo.no/PUB/rapp/378/378.pdf 
 
 Umar, M.B. ‘The Kimberley Process: What Prospects Exist for Sustainable Peace and 
Development in some Conflict Regions of Africa’. 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/html/car7_article12.pdf 
 
UN Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Multinational Corporations in Least 
Developed Countries (LDC)’ 2002, accessible from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2002/modelun.pdf 
 
UN Global Compact, ‘Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive 
Business, New York, April 2005  
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/portal/default.asp 
 
UN, “Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War,” General Assembly Resolution on Conflict 
Diomonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, New York, 2000 
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/diomond.html 
 
UN, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2’ New 
York, 2003 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html 
 
 98 
UN, “Security Council Discusses Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, 
Post-Conflict Peace-Building,” New York, 15 April, 2005. 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8058.doc.htm - 64k 
 
 
 
 
 
  
